Pursuing the Great Spirit’s Power: Ojibwa Ways of Revitalizing the Failing World System

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INTRODUCTION

The concept of power in Ojibwa thought has been associated with autonomy, control and responsible action on behalf of others, in ways quite distinct from western notions of competitive self-interest.¹ This paper will examine the operation of what has been termed power-control, as exhibited for over a century by leaders of the Ojibwa community of Garden River, just east of Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario. One family in particular, the descendants of Shinguakonse, or The Little Pine, acted in accordance with conceptions of power-control even when events made it increasingly difficult for them to uphold such values. Their struggle to preserve cherished ways of thinking and acting nevertheless succeeded in its main goals. The tradition of leadership established by The Little Pine survived well into the twentieth century, since, as this paper endeavours to demonstrate, generations of Garden River power-holders continually sought to protect and develop potentialities inherent in traditional group prerogatives, including a specific interest in land and resources.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Ojibwa concept of power was first articulated by A. Irving Hallowell. According to Hallowell, power-holders had the ability to transform not only themselves, but also their environments.² Mary Black-Rogers later modified Hallowell’s perspective on what constituted the Ojibwa view of power by introducing the idea of POWER-CONTROL, where the power-holder’s end was personal autonomy rather than self interest. Power-control also embodied the notion of responsible action on behalf

of one’s group. Competent Ojibwa leadership required that an individual in charge maintain the unit’s autonomy and self-sufficiency in the face of external challenges.³

To arrive at her concept of power-control, Black-Rogers employed a question and answer technique in her interviews with Ojibwa speakers to elicit a range of stable responses about power-holders generally, within a circumscribed linguistic domain, bemaadiziwaad or ‘living things’. Beings possessed of the wherewithal to alter their immediate environmental contexts by their actions were viewed as exhibiting considerable power-control.⁴

Owing to its utility in explaining the behaviour of traditional chiefs, Black-Rogers’ notion of power-control⁵ has served as a useful explanatory device for examinations of Ojibwa interaction relating to the fur-trade era as well as the modern milieu. In such studies the idea that power-holders tried to ensure sustained autonomy for their groups militates against a prevailing stereotype of Ojibwa leaders as frequently unprincipled, disorganized and driven primarily by self-interest.⁶ Such negative assumptions underlay many nineteenth-century official perspectives and press reports regarding the actions in 1849 of Chief Shinguakonse, who participated in the dispossession of a copper mine on the north shore of Lake Superior.⁷ When mining companies began operations on unceded Indian lands, Shinguakonse, with a small party of followers, seized one holding north of Sault Ste. Marie belonging to the Quebec and Lake Superior Mining Association.

No more than thirty-five individuals ever took part in the event. The Ojibwa leaders involved included Shinguakonse, another chief by the name of Nebenagogooching from Batchewana on Lake Superior, and three Métis, Pierre and Eustace Lesage and Charles Boyer. Three lawyers from

⁵ Mary Black-Rogers, “Dan Raincloud” (1989).
Toronto — Allan Macdonell and his brother Angus, and Charles Metcalfe — formed the non-Native participants.

Allegations arose that Shinguakonse had been manipulated to take over the mine by Allan Macdonell, who at one time had held a part interest in the mining operations which had been dispossessed. William MacTavish, the Hudson’s Bay factor at Michipicoten, held that the whole affair constituted a protest launched by Macdonell against a decision made by the directorate of the mining company to turn the mine into a speculative enterprise rather than a long-term venture. To MacTavish, Macdonell’s alleged friendship with Shinguakonse sprang from the lawyer’s hope that the chief might grant him licenses to the lands, independent of the Quebec and Lake Superior Mining Association, should the government in the future recognize the existence of Native title.\(^8\)

John Bonner, the manager of the Quebec and Lake Superior Mining Association, painted an even more unsavory picture of Macdonell. For instance, he charged that the lawyer had made Shinguakonse so drunk prior to the Mica Bay incident that the chief arrived at the mine site “in a state of insensibility”.\(^9\) To these allegations Macdonell replied that he had simply acted as the chief’s agent; he never had any intention of manipulating the judgement of a Native leader for personal ends.\(^10\)

A third person, the Reverend Frederick O’Meara, the local Anglican missionary, quickly linked the mine incident to the Montreal-based Annexation Movement, which called for the union of the Canadas with the United States. This proved to be a wholly unsustainable charge, since Macdonell represented Toronto, not Montreal interests.\(^11\) Yet it showed that, like MacTavish and Bonner, O’Meara evidenced far more distrust of Macdonell than concern over Shinguakonse’s rationale for participating in the mine takeover. All three men chose to ignore Shinguakonse’s role in the affair, while playing down the fact that Macdonell ultimately had little to gain from the mine’s dispossession, other than the chance to

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defend an early legal conception of aboriginal right to land and resources.

There can be little doubt that Macdonell felt strongly persuaded by Shinguakonse's demands that Native rights be respected. The issue furnished him with a unique legal challenge which he tenaciously pursued even after the Ojibwa had surrendered the tract which originally had drawn his interest.\(^\text{12}\) So forceful were his exertions in support of this cause that his loyalties nearly caused his arrest under the Act to Make Provision for the Administration of Justice in the Unorganized Tracts of Country in Upper Canada (16 Vict., cap. 176) — a law passed in direct response to the Mica Bay incident. Under this new legislation persons viewed as "inciting" the Native population to disturb the public peace could be sentenced for up to five years in the provincial penitentiary.\(^\text{13}\)

In Toronto and Montreal, meanwhile, the Mica Bay event elicited such a range of contradictory press responses that it grew obvious that those in metropolitan centres had little idea of what actually had occurred on the frontier. For instance, in mid-November *The Patriot*, a Toronto paper, took an almost macabre pleasure in reporting, albeit erroneously, that owing to government mismanagement of the claims issue, the Ojibwa had attacked miners on Lake Superior, "Killing 150 persons and taking 80 persons into the interior."\(^\text{14}\) At the same time *The Montreal Gazette* heralded Macdonell as no less than the champion of Native rights.\(^\text{15}\) Facing a public outcry invoked by press reports sympathetic to the Native stance, the government hurried to assume its responsibilities to the Ojibwa under the Royal Proclamation of 1763, with ensuing negotiations between the Crown and the Native peoples resulting in the Robinson Huron and Robinson Superior Treaties of 1850.

Shinguakonse, for his part, followed a distinctively Native agenda. The mine takeover offered him an opportunity to demonstrate power-control on a grand scale. Prior to the incident he had devised a far-reaching plan whereby Ojibwa residing south of Lake Superior,

\(^{12}\) Allan Macdonell to Robert Bruce, 23 December 1849, NAC RG 10 vol 179, 103884.

\(^{13}\) Allan Macdonell to George Brown, 30 April 1853, Archives of Ontario, MS 91, George Brown Papers, Correspondence, pkg. 11.

\(^{14}\) *The Patriot*, 21 November 1849.

\(^{15}\) *The Montreal Gazette*, 23 November 1849.
threatened by the American removal policy, might be relocated to Native communities on the north shores of Lakes Huron and Superior. Shinguakonse’s plan ultimately failed, but the spirit in which he pursued his objectives gained him a permanent place in many aadisookaanag, the oral traditions about legendary beings with power which crown the repertoire of local Ojibwa historians. Because it is still held that aadisookaanag convey notions about power-control from one generation to the next, one elderly respondent from Garden River remarked while reciting the stories that he “felt good about telling them”.

Since Shinguakonse would have gauged his actions more by the tenets of the power belief system than by self-interest, it seems unlikely that the chief would ever have wished to relinquish total control over the tracts ceded under the Robinson treaties. His attachment to traditional notions of group responsibility would have required him to continue to exercise some degree of proprietary right over contexts of significance to his group’s long-term interests, a premise which he may well have sought to test in his decision to take over the copper mine in the first place. Employing both an ethnohistorical and cultural perspective, this paper examines Shinguakonse’s role and motives in the years surrounding 1849. It also lays a foundation for understanding why Shinguakonse’s decision-making has become precedent-setting in the arena of Native rights to land and resources, especially for modern Ojibwa leaders intent on preserving milieus conducive to the preservation of cherished Native values.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SHINGUAKONSE’S PLAN

Shinguakonse’s name first appears in the writings of Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, an American Indian agent who lauded the chief’s singlehanded success in thwarting an Ojibwa attack on a party of American officials assembled in 1820 at Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, to obtain a land surrender. Schoolcraft soon came to admire Shinguakonse for other reasons as well. The Little Pine willingly shared information concerning Ojibwa culture, especially regarding the Midéwiwin, or Grand Medicine Society — the leading power-holder affiliation within the Great

16 Interview with Fred Pine Sr., Garden River, Ont., 31 August 1982.
17 Henry R. Schoolcraft, Personal memoirs of a residence of thirty years with the Indian tribes on the American frontiers (Philadelphia, 1851), 48–49.
The complex rituals of the Grand Medicine Society — while evidencing ancient precedents — also provided an important nineteenth-century forum for Ojibwa leaders to express their political views. Each power-holder was expected to contribute a measure of his personal power and perceptivity towards revitalization and healing within the Upper Great Lakes Native community. As a member of the Midéwiwin, Shinguakonse could foster and sustain political contacts with leaders from the farthest reaches of the Ojibwa community.

Although Shinguakonse was racially Métis, he was culturally Ojibwa. The son of a white fur trader and a Native woman, he experienced a vision as a youth which imbued him with the idea that the Sun Spirit endowed him with special powers to help his people in culturally sanctioned ways, provided his motives remained true to Ojibwa ideals. He travelled widely — to Red River, into interior Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota, and fought at Detroit and Queenston Heights in the War of 1812. By the time he reached middle age, Native and non-Native observers alike commented on his handsome appearance, commanding presence and strong oratorical skills.

To white officialdom, both British and American, Shinguakonse nevertheless remained an enigma. Schoolcraft hoped that the chief might be induced to favour the Americans after 1820, and proved surprised at Shinguakonse’s tenacity in supporting the British cause. By 1832 The Little Pine stressed his disinclination to engage in hostilities with the American government, or indeed any potential foe. Heartened by the orations of the Methodist Ojibwa exhorter, John Sunday, at Penetanguishene, Shinguakonse publicly stated that he would henceforth relinquish all thoughts of warfare and revenge and concentrate on abiding by the tenets of the Christian religion. Using the traditional mode of appealing for power, he would seek after Sunday’s God, by “feeling very poor in his heart”.

Not that The Little Pine ever became a Methodist. His closest

attachments were with the Anglican church — the religion of the British sovereign. Yet, from 1832 to 1841 Shinguakonse took great pains to learn everything he could regarding the various competing religious denominations in Upper Great Lakes district — Baptists, Roman Catholics, Methodists and Anglicans. No source of potential power would be overlooked. Pressing problems in the Ojibwa community, however, brought the chief’s mind back to more immediate concerns.

Foremost among these was the American government’s avowed intention after 1836 to move all the American Ojibwa west of the Missouri. Almost immediately The Little Pine launched an immense campaign to induce as many American Ojibwa and Métis as possible to settle on territory at Garden River and other locations near the British Sault.21 At the same time the chief set out to encourage the British colonial government to assist him in this endeavour. When his appeals bore no fruit, and Manitoulin Island instead of the Sault became the place designated as a refugium for tribes not only from the American side but also from north of Lakes Huron and Superior, Shinguakonse quickly had to revise his earlier position.22

During this time The Little Pine drew upon his extensive talents for weighing and evaluating evidence before making any firm decisions. Shinguakonse did not want to move. Since 1835 he had used his position as a leading British chief to secure rights to cut timber and protect Native fisheries at the rapids so that his people would have a secure economic base.23 And for five years Shinguakonse retained this headship uncontested. Yet despite his determination to remain at the Sault, the resident Indian agent, Thomas G. Anderson, did induce the chief to stay one winter on Manitoulin Island, near the government-sponsored Anglican missionary establishment at Manitowaning.

If the British Indian Department expected The Little Pine to assist actively in their mission goals they were to be rudely disappointed. The chief immediately assumed a liminal political role on Manitoulin Island which protected him from both government and missionary manipulations. As he did not bring his band with him, he could upbraid the

goals of the Manitowaning experiment without consequences redounding to the detriment of his people. When the local agent stressed the advantages of taking up agriculture, relinquishing the fur trade, and practising a frontier form of Anglicanism, Shinguakonse retorted that he refused to sit like a gull on a barren rocky terrain when fishing, hunting and farming were so much better at Garden River, near the Sault.24

Aware that the American Ojibwa might be pressured westward against their wishes, The Little Pine regularly expressed his disillusionment with governmental and missionary lack of concern with economic and political issues affecting his people. When Roman Catholic and Anglican missionaries began to debate the relative merits of their respective denominations within Shinguakonse’s earshot, the chief could no longer contain his annoyance. How, he interrupted, when all living things possessed some degree of power, could North America have fallen under just two powers? And how could these powers be so precocious as to divide, to their own advantage, his people’s lands? Were missionaries really concerned about the Ojibwa’s fate in this seemingly increasingly dualistic universe?

You are two Blackcoats... now I want to know if our Saviour marked in the Bible that the whites would journey towards the setting sun until they found a large island in which there were many Indians living in a rich country — that they should rob the natives of their animals, furs and land, after which the English and Americans should draw a line, from one to the other end of the Island and each take his share and do what he pleases with the Natives?25

For most of his time on Manitoulin Island, however, The Little Pine rarely stressed such strong views, since the Ojibwa belief system advocated ritualized powerlessness as an avenue to future spiritual blessings.26 According to oral traditions at Garden River, the problem for The Little Pine lay at a deeper level than geopolitics. From the standpoint of his shamanic perspective he viewed the disruptions among his people to be no less than cosmological. It would require a brave


power-holder to confront the hidden forces which threatened to displace, and perhaps even annihilate, his people. As one legend maintained, “He could not turn back. He had a purpose... a gift. ‘And then what kind of man would I be?’, he said. You cannot leave the path. You wouldn’t be remembered.”

By the late spring of 1841 Shinguakonse was back at Garden River. For a year The Little Pine had dwelt in the wilderness of strange ideologies and ideas and now he returned to his familiar rivers, lakes and woods with their inhabitants, human, animal and spiritual. To The Little Pine, there would be no land surrenders, at least not yet. He would retain his power base intact. His territory near the Sault instead would be logged, farmed and fished by the Native population. The commercial milieu had improved as well; western expansion and better economic times in the United States encouraged rising fish prices, followed by a resurgence of commercial fishing at the Sault rapids. Competition among local fur buyers arose following the demise of the American Fur Company, and a merchant near Garden River began hiring Native loggers to supply his mill. Most important, however, since Native participation in mineral exploration north of Lakes Huron and Superior had proven profitable for some band members, the chief grew anxious to seek potential revenue from that direction as well.

With redoubled energy The Little Pine prepared to put his plan for a self-sufficient Native community into effect. From 1845 to 1849 Shinguakonse never wavered in his intent to secure a land base which not only could support a substantial number of refugee American Ojibwa, but which also could provide these people with secure political linkages to the emerging Canadian nation-state. There is no doubt that The Little Pine knew that external political structures were changing and that the Ojibwa must adjust along with them.

Shinguakonse’s most formidable contest lay with forces which threatened to compel his people, once integral parts of the fur trade economy, into relative political, economic and social insignificance. What is more, it appears that Shinguakonse felt he had support from all seen and unseen
spiritual entities of the traditional Ojibwa universe. For example, prior to the early nineteenth century, Ojibwa beliefs respecting copper placed outcrops under the auspices of often formidable spiritual agencies, which proved threatening to those who lacked the power to wrest the copper from their protection. Copper underlay the essential balance of the cosmos — too valuable an item to be removed negligently without due concern for consequences. 29 Yet Shinguakonse felt that the time had come — that somehow events proved propitious for the Native population to claim their fair share of the benefits the whites already seemed to be enjoying from this source.

By 1847 mining companies had surveyed thirty large mineral locations, each 10 square miles (26 km²) in area, on the northern shores of Lakes Huron and Superior. Two of these lay just north of the Sault, in the region of Mica Bay, whereas four covered most of the Garden River tract. Allan Macdonell and several others formed the Quebec and Lake Superior Mining Association, which mined one of the Mica Bay sites on the northeastern coast of Lake Superior. Macdonell initially responded to The Little Pine’s appeals for help, since under the chief’s direction the Sault Ste. Marie, Michipicoten and Fort William bands agreed to guide prospectors to copper, iron, silver and gold exposures. 30 In return the lawyer pledged to see that Native claims to proprietorship over mineral deposits would be recognized in law and that a system of leases and royalties would be implemented to ensure the Ojibwa a share in potential mining returns. The Ojibwa thus predicted that their future would be enhanced by a system of special protections, new entrepreneurial contacts and improved linkages to government. 31

Difficulties unfortunately soon followed in the wake of these hopes. Lake Superior chiefs began to request that Shinguakonse represent specific grievances against certain mining companies. Miners burned the woods, blasted the rocks, and drove away game. They stripped the land of valuable timber. In May 1847 The Little Pine found he had to intervene to stop the survey of the Lemoine location, which took in the whole area of his own Native village and extended a good way up the

29 Chute, A century of Native leadership (1986), 33.
30 John Keating to J. M. Higginson, Civil Secretary, 10 June 1846, NAC, RG 10, v. 159.
31 Petition of Chief Chingwauk, 10 June 1846, NAC, RG 10, v. 612, Petition no. 156.
Garden River. Faced with such encroachments on all sides, Shinguakonse asked for an audience with the Governor General so that the Native people might attain a share of what might be found on their lands. “I call God to witness in the beginning and do so now again and say that it was false that the land is not ours, it is ours”, The Little Pine declared.

On receiving no reply, The Little Pine, accompanied by his son Ogista, his interpreter, Louis Cadotte, and his lawyer, Allan Macdonell, travelled unannounced to Montreal in the spring of 1849 to meet with the Governor General, Lord Elgin. To ascertain the validity of the chief’s complaints, Elgin despatched Thomas G. Anderson, then Visiting Superintendent of Indian Affairs residing in Cobourg, to investigate the matter personally.

When Anderson arrived in the Upper Great Lakes region in August, The Little Pine and Peau de Chat, a Fort William chief, both held that they expected long-term compensation for surrendering any of their rights to minerals and timber. In reply, Alexander Vidal, a surveyor and mathematician who accompanied Anderson’s party, argued forcefully that the Ojibwa lacked rights to subsurface resources. Their rights — if they had any at all — Vidal maintained, were merely ones of occupancy. Faced with such statements, Shinguakonse and Macdonell redoubled their campaign. In one of The Little Pine’s speeches translated by Cadotte and released to the American press, the Ojibwa demanded no less than implementation of a system granting them the right to compensation for injuries to a resource base they unquestionably saw as being under their own proprietorship and protection:

The Great Spirit, we think, placed these rich mines on our lands, for the benefit of his red children so that their rising generation might get

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32 George Desbarats to Major Campbell, 10 May 1847; Report of a Committee of the Executive Council, 2 November 1846, approved by His Excellency in Council the same day, NAC, RG 10; copies in Indian File, Bruce Mines Museum.


34 T. G. Anderson to the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 26 August 1848, NAC, RG 1, E5, ECO file 1157, v. 8.

35 Memorandum of Indian Mission, 1849, Regional Collections, University of Western Ontario, Vidal Papers, CA 9ON, VID 33.
support from them when the animals of the woods should have grown too scarce for our subsistence. We will carry out, therefore, the good object of our father, the Great Spirit. We will sell you lands, if you will give us what is right and at the same time, we want pay for every pound of mineral that has been taken off our lands, as well as for that which may hereafter be carried away.\textsuperscript{36}

Shinguakonse anticipated that the government would provide estimates of the worth of Native lands and resources, but when none were forthcoming, chiefs simply pressed for arbitrary amounts. Shinguakonse suggested ten dollars a head, while Peau de Chat demanded twenty.\textsuperscript{37}

When negotiations stalled and seemed to be headed for a deadlock by fall, the Ojibwa launched their ultimate protest against encroachments on their lands. Aroused by a loud knocking at four in the morning on 14 November 1849, John Bonner opened his office door to be confronted by The Little Pine, Nebenagoching, and the two Macdonells, who charged that the mine operations must cease and the local workers and their families be evacuated — which occurred the following day.\textsuperscript{38} To defend himself against allegations that his willingness to call for a general evacuation implicated his secret compliance with the takeover, Bonner immediately branded Allan Macdonell as the primary perpetrator of the incident. Macdonell, Bonner charged, used his position as intermediary with the Ojibwa to secure leases which would be profitable only to himself.\textsuperscript{39} To this Macdonell replied that his actions had been authorized solely by the Ojibwa, who looked to him to defend their rights.\textsuperscript{40} And there the matter stood until early December. Although troops were despatched to the Sault to apprehend the expedition members, the Native participants received warnings but no punishment. On 4 December 1849 Allan and Angus Macdonell, Shinguakonse, Nebenagoching, Nowquagabo, Pierre and Eustace Lesage and Charles Boyer voluntarily surrendered themselves to the justices of the

\textsuperscript{36} T. G. Anderson to Major Campbell, 9 October 1849, NAC, RG 10, v. 173, 100434-6.


\textsuperscript{39} The British Colonist, 8 February 1850.

\textsuperscript{40} The Patriot, 19 December 1849.
peace at the Sault. Upon being sent to Toronto, they remained in jail for a few days, and then were released by the Chief Justice, Sir John Beverley Robinson, a relative through marriage to Macdonell. Robinson held that they had been arrested illegally.\(^{41}\) Later the trial was bound over, and eventually the incident was permanently shelved.

Such leniency was undoubtedly gauged to forestall public outcry, for the presence of the Native party in the metropolis caused quite a stir. The fact that Shinguakonse had fought on the British side in the War of 1812 and now was on trial circulated in both the British and American newspapers. Faced with such embarrassing revelations — especially when reporting shifted over to considerations of the validity of aboriginal rights — the government seriously began to search for an approach which would settle the claims issue for once and for all.

AFTERMATH OF THE AFFAIR

In September 1850, William B. Robinson, the mine manager of the Montreal Mining Company which maintained holdings at Mica Bay but was not directly affected by the incident of 1849, presided over two treaty signings. The Robinson treaties provided the Native population of the north shore of Lakes Huron and Superior with reserves, lump sums in compensation, hunting and fishing rights and annuities.

Although his name appears on the Robinson Huron Treaty, Shinguakonse strongly opposed the tenor of these agreements and immediately began raising monies to go to England to meet with Queen Victoria to press for his original plan. By the fall of 1853 he had travelled as far as Penetanguishene, collecting money as he went, but soon returned because of illness to Garden River.\(^{42}\) On arriving back, he learned of the government’s total dismissal of a petition from head chiefs representing 2,000 American Ojibwa, asking for permission to settle in Native communities on the Canadian side.\(^{43}\) It must have dealt the elderly chief a massive blow. Two years later the American government would

\(^{41}\) Allan Macdonell to Robert Bruce, 21 December 1849, NAC, RG 10, v. 179, 109890.


\(^{43}\) NAC, RG 10, v. 198, part 1, 116289.
relinquish its intention of relocating the American Ojibwa west of the Missouri, and the immediate need to find a refuge on Canadian soil would abate. But of this eventuality Shinguakonse would never learn, for he died in the fall of 1854.

His death left a major power vacuum, which his son Ogista briefly tried to fill in the fall of 1854 by attacking the Quebec and Lake Superior Mining Association's holdings on Michipicoten Island. But this time no Macdonell came to his aid. Ogista had misjudged his context; the time for such manoeuvres was past. Mining interests, apprehending weaknesses in the Ojibwa's resistance to their activities, mounted a strong campaign to attain Native lands by resurveying reserve boundaries to remove productive mineral and timber areas from Native control. During these years a system of elected chiefs and councils replaced traditional Ojibwa leadership. Yet the hope Shinguakonse expressed that rock, mineral and timber resources could provide some measure of revenue remained, to guide action within the new bureaucraticized political forum.

In 1914 for instance, when a company illegally began removing gravel from the Buhkwujjenewabick, a traprock bluff lying northeast of the Garden River village, the elected chief and council mounted strong opposition. So adamant was their stance that the Ojibwa gained federal government backing for their demands that quarry boundaries set by the Ojibwa be respected, a fixed revenue be forthcoming to the band, jobs be created and the site revert to the band as soon as quarrying ceased.

Since this was a victory in line with The Little Pine's original goals it is perhaps not surprising that oral traditions portray the agreement over the Buhkwujjenewabick in somewhat the same light as the takeover of the Mica Bay mine. Elders spoke of invisible spiritual beings, which guarded the stone in a manner similar to the way spiritual agencies protected copper deposits on Lake Superior. Shot with "seed" or "cork" by the Wild Men, all persons and institutions who ignored boundaries laid out

46 Archives of Ontario, Dept. of Indian Affairs, Sault Ste. Marie Agency Records, 1924, MS 216 (8); "Garden River trap rock deposit to be operated — $1,000,000 plant assured", *Sault Star*, 23 November 1928.
Ask he powe god
Seek Lake
Mark wa ga bow
Lake in ye gum
Mik ee je
We go shan
Of he powe he hit hit
V a banz
Hi chi he me de
Na sa po do
Amor
He ni te meow
You l um i meli
Man je be
Ma ta go mi
Akan de ham
Ruk ud day bi a co
Ma shin a way
Wah ga ya bunow
He kiss ham
Amon ke quoked

In behalf of the
above chiefs I have inquint of the
salt of Marinc of garden. This is a chief
if they would be willing to allow
this America is to come out
and settle on these lands they are
dwelling with your consent to live
Here. We most ask your leave

With red hands

Big stick say he will stay year along
When you and the Foremen has
given your consent

You are two o' our People ale

to gather

Figure 1. NAC RG 10, v. 198, part 1: 116289
by the chief would become “crazy”. This propensity of the modern Ojibwa to translate geographic landscape into symbolic space endowed events both at Mica Bay and the quarry with heightened significance. Though the 1914 negotiations concerned nothing more glamorous than gravel, the leaders involved would be endowed with aadisookaanag status, and the consequences of the agreement recited in story after story. Similar to the Mica Bay takeover, events at the Buhkwuujenewabick were endowed with mythic appeal, serving as symbolic precedents for future action.

CONCLUSION

The Ojibwa belief system constitutes a level of reality that is not open to negotiation, according to elders interviewed in the 1980s at Garden River, because it holds part of the key to Ojibwa cultural distinctiveness. A leader’s personal competence arises from his ability to overcome limits and expose new pathways for development for those for whom he is responsible. The maintenance of a milieu congenial to the survival of cultural values important to the Ojibwa remained a persistent theme from the 1830s to 1914. Decline of the fur trade and the advent of mining and logging heralded an extensive elaboration of ideological concepts, but no radical departures from the fundamental cultural premises of power control. Even today, since so many aspects of the traditional world view continue to inform Native responses to external political, economic and religious agencies, aadisookaanag concerning Shinguakonse remain powerful transmitting mediums for the kind of aims this leader upheld during his lifetime. The Little Pine’s descendants and others are expected to maintain the tradition and generally do, although after 1900 they were removed from direct participation in the increasingly bureaucratized political arena. In this common endeavour to maintain a milieu, founded on values the chief upheld, the mantle of leadership, often divided between individualistic and bureaucratic manifestations, become one, to engender the same confidence and hope for the future that Shinguakonse himself placed in his people and culture.

47 Interview with Norman Jones, Garden River, Ont., 22 September 1982.
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