Abstract: This paper assesses the validity of S.E. Finer’s “five conditions of military intervention in politics” in the context of the 1999 military coup in Pakistan. According to Finer, the professionalization of the officer corps, the rise of nationalism and the nation-state, popular sovereignty, the emergence of an “insurrectionary army” and the creation of “new, independent states” contribute to a military’s decision to supplant the civilian authority and intervene in the governance of a country. The findings of this paper confirm that while not all of Finer’s conditions are necessarily fully applicable to Pakistan, his overall framework nonetheless accounts for the major drivers of the 1999 coup.

Introduction

In his 1962 study, The Man on Horseback, S.E. Finer identifies five necessary “conditions of military intervention in politics:” professionalization of the officer corps, the rise of nationalism and the nation-state, popular sovereignty, the emergence of an “insurrectionary army” and the creation of “new, independent states.” Finer suggests that these conditions contributed to many of the military revolts and attempted coups in the 1960s, such as those in Lebanon, Turkey, Venezuela, Portugal and Ethiopia. While this may hold true for the geopolitical context of the 1960s, it remains to be seen if Finer’s framework has widespread applicability. The paper, therefore, proposes the following research question: does Finer’s framework hold for the case of the 1999 military coup in Pakistan?
It will be argued that while not all of Finer’s conditions are necessarily fully applicable to Pakistan, his overall framework nonetheless accounts for the major drivers of the 1999 coup. The paper will define key terms, provide background on the 1999 coup, and outline the research design and present data for each of the five conditions to assess the findings. The paper will conclude with a discussion on future avenues of research.

Definitions

Finer refers to “military intervention in politics” as a scaled measurement with four distinct levels of severity. The first level is influence, whereby the military attempts to convince the civil government through reason or emotion. The second level is characterised by pressures or “threats of sanction” used to persuade civil authorities in favour of the military. These levels are similar because the military maintains “the supremacy of the civil power.” Civil supremacy is uprooted in the third level, entitled displacement, as the military “replaces one set of politicians with another more compliant set” either through violence or the threat of violence. The 1999 coup in Pakistan is an example of the final level, referred to as supplantment. This level represents the ultimate intervention in politics as the military overtakes the entire civilian regime and establishes complete control of the state.

“Finer’s framework” is comprised of the following five “conditions of military intervention in politics:”

The professionalization of the officer corps: According to Finer, professionalism may lead to military intervention in politics if officers see themselves as “the servants of the state rather than of the government in power.” The likelihood of intervention amplifies if the government’s policies are perceived to “impinge on the military task” or if politicians are seen as “using” the armed forces for their “own sordid purposes.” Finer notes that corporate unity

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3. Ibid., 77.
4. Ibid., 22.
5. Ibid., 23.
and expertise, in particular, perpetuate this belief because armed forces begin to view themselves as better judges of military and security matters than the civilian authority.\(^6\)

**The rise of nationalism and the nation-state:** Finer contends that this condition could trigger intervention because it reinforces the military's perception that it is the guardian of the nation's values.\(^7\) In this context, the government must demonstrate that it is “synonymous with and representative of the nation” to avoid intervention and gain the military's loyalty.\(^8\)

**The substitution from the divine authority of kings to the dogma of popular sovereignty:** Popular sovereignty is the idea that “the people are the sole source of all legitimate power.”\(^9\) Finer argues that popular sovereignty provides a rationale for any group, including the military, to seize power by claiming to represent the will of the people.\(^10\)

**Insurrectionary armies:** Such armies are particularly prone to intervene in politics because, by definition, they seek to liberate the territory and overthrow social order.\(^11\)

**The emergence of new, independent states:** Finer notes that the quest for independence often breeds nationalism and exacerbates existing economic, ethnic and religious cleavages.\(^12\) He contends that these conditions represent “a sure invitation to military intervention” because the professional military is not only a symbol of nationhood, but it is often able to fulfill the “need for a strong central government.”\(^13\)

**Background**

Pakistan has a long tradition of military intervention in politics, including three military coups since its creation in 1947.\(^14\) The 1999 coup was especially important not only in so far as

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6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 189.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 190.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., 191.
13. Ibid.
it ended almost eleven years of democracy but also because it marked the beginning of nearly a decade of military rule.\textsuperscript{15}

The coup was triggered by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s decision to replace General Pervez Musharraf as Chief of the Army Staff on October 12\textsuperscript{th}, 1999.\textsuperscript{16} Tensions between Musharraf and Sharif had been brewing since May 1999, when without consulting Sharif, Musharraf ordered Pakistani troops to cross into the Indian-controlled area of Kashmir.\textsuperscript{17} This decision by Musharraf triggered a series of back-and-forth retaliations with India, which eventually resulted in the Kargil War.\textsuperscript{18}

Sensing an emergent loss of political control over Musharraf and the military, in July 1999, Sharif travelled to Washington D.C. Sharif’s objective was to seek US President Bill Clinton’s support in order to legitimize his authority in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{19} Strobe Talbott, then US Deputy Secretary of State, recounts that it became evident that Sharif “neither knew everything his military high command was doing nor had complete control over it.”\textsuperscript{20} Talbott notes that Sharif acted genuinely surprised when Clinton, using US intelligence reports, explained that Musharraf was preparing nuclear weapons to attack India.\textsuperscript{21} Indeed, Sharif maintained that he had never authorized such an action.\textsuperscript{22} During his visit, Sharif also revealed to Clinton that “he was worried for his life.”\textsuperscript{23}

Clinton’s position, however, remained firm: a precondition to US intervention would be a complete and unilateral withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the Indian side of the border.\textsuperscript{24} After intense pressure from Clinton, Sharif reluctantly agreed to withdraw his troops.\textsuperscript{25} In exchange, Clinton agreed to take a “personal interest in encouraging” the Lahore peace process

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[16.\ ] Aziz, Military Control, 90.
\item[18.\ ] Ibid.
\item[20.\ ] Ibid., 167.
\item[21.\ ] Ibid.
\item[22.\ ] Ibid.
\item[23.\ ] Ibid., 168.
\item[24.\ ] Ibid., 165.
\item[25.\ ] Ibid., 168.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
between Pakistan and India. Sharif’s withdrawal agreement with Clinton and decision to re-engage in the Lahore process was strongly contested by Musharraf. Musharraf, according to Bruce Riedel, a Special Assistant to Clinton, “was said to be a hardliner on Kashmir, a man some feared was determined to humble India once and for all.”

Suspecting backlash from Musharraf and the military, Shahbaz Sharif, Nawaz Sharif’s brother, asked the U.S. State Department to release a statement to “strongly oppose” any attempt by “political and military actors” to remove the government from power. There was a looming sense within the Sharif camp that a military coup would be imminent.

Musharraf, for his part, was well informed of Sharif’s trepidation. In his memoir, *In the Line of Fire*, he writes, “it was unfortunate that (Nawaz Sharif) distrusted my good intentions…his misplaced perception of my loyalty, coupled with the suspicion that I was planning a coup, must have led to Nawaz Sharif’s paranoia.”

To circumvent a potential coup, Sharif dismissed Musharraf on October 12th, 1999 appointing a new Chief of Army Staff. Upon hearing the news, Musharraf’s army subordinates refused to accept his replacement; planning and orchestrating instead a military coup within a mere 17 hours. At the time, Musharraf was mid-air on a commercial flight returning back to Pakistan from an official visit to Sri Lanka. Sharif denied landing privileges to Musharraf’s flight in hopes of forcing Musharraf into exile. However, Sharif was unsuccessful in these efforts, because after circling for several hours and running out of fuel, the plane eventually managed to make an emergency landing in Karachi.

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26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
Upon his arrival in Karachi, Musharraf immediately declared a state of emergency and appointed himself as Chief Executive of Pakistan. His cohorts overtook Parliament in Islamabad, placing Sharif under arrest, facing a possible death penalty. After interventions from the US and Saudi Arabia, Musharraf relented, allowing Sharif to leave Pakistan. Thus, on December 11th, 2000 Sharif was exiled to Saudi Arabia and the coup was “legitimized by the Supreme Court under the doctrine of state necessity.” In his memoir, Musharraf describes Sharif’s decision to replace him as “a gross misuse and misapplication of the law,” likening it to a coup in and of itself. According to Musharraf, the army’s response was merely a “countercoup.”

Research Design and Methodology

The following table presents specific measures for each of Finer’s five conditions. The measures were derived directly from Finer’s study and will be used to assess whether Finer’s framework holds for the Pakistan case. The thesis will be confirmed if the Pakistani case proves to be consistent with the majority of the measures presented below:

37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., 187.
39. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
Table 1: Measures for Finer’s framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition 1: Professionalization of the officer corps</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Are the Pakistan Armed Forces a “professional” military?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expertise: Specialized knowledge and skill acquired through education and experience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Social responsibility towards the state</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate unity: Sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group part from laymen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Did professionalism contribute to the military's decision to launch the 1999 coup?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gap between role and responsibility of the army and politicians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception that politicians’ control over foreign affairs and domestic matters frustrates and impinges on the military task</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition 2: Rise of nationalism and the nation-state</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces as visible symbol and pledge of nationhood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military ideology and programme based on nationalism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Military loyalty to the nation</td>
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<tr>
<th>Condition 3: The substitution for the divine authority of kings of the dogma of popular sovereignty</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military plea that it embodies the sovereignty of the people</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition 4: Insurrectionary armies</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military history of working for the liberation of the national territory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Military history of working for the overthrow of social order</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition 5: The emergence of new, independent states</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recent independence from colonialism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergence of economic, ethnic and religious cleavages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call for a strong, central government after independence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The paper will employ data from both primary and secondary sources to explore the above measures. Sources include official government publications, speeches, and memoirs from military personnel, including Musharraf, as well as case studies by both Pakistani and Western scholars.

42. The table is organized according to Finer’s own classification of measures as they relate to each of the five conditions.
The paper assumes that Finer’s observations regarding the 1960s coups and the logic behind the five conditions are sound. For example, the paper accepts his logic that professionalism impels the military to intervene in politics. Moreover, it assumes that professionalism does, in fact, carry universal meaning and can be applied to non-Western armies such as the Pakistani Armed Forces. The paper also assumes that it is reasonable to quantify Finer’s narrative style into specific measures as presented in the above table.

As with all research, this paper has certain limitations. It does not use statistical analysis to assess the degree of correlation between the five conditions and military intervention, nor does it assess the extent to which each of the conditions individually contributed to the coup. Instead, it aims to demonstrate that the framework, as a whole, holds for the coup. Further, the paper only covers the case of the 1999 coup in Pakistan. Therefore, the findings will be relevant only for this case and cannot be generalized to all contemporary military interventions.

Lastly, the paper relies heavily on secondary sources which may produce different results regarding professionalism and the role of the military than reliance on government publications or official military documents. The decision to consult secondary sources is largely based on the fact that most military documents in Pakistan are unavailable to the public.

Despite these limitations, this paper contributes to the existing body of research on civil-military relations in two distinct ways. First, it tests the validity of Finer’s framework. This is important because while past scholars have offered critiques of Finer’s study and have even considered its applicability to more recent cases, none have tested it in this specific context.43

The second contribution is that the paper attempts to understand the 1999 coup through a theoretical lens. As noted by Zulfiqar Ali, many scholars have “explored the causes

attributed to the failure of democracy in Pakistan,” however few have “employed a theoretical framework to understand the empirical reality.”

Results and Data Analysis for Condition 1

*Professionalization of the officer corps*

The first “condition of military intervention in politics” is the professionalization of the officer corps. This section will present data regarding the expertise, social responsibility and corporate unity of the Pakistan Armed Forces to determine whether they constitute a “professional” military. It will then assess whether professionalism contributed to the military’s decision to launch the 1999 coup by considering whether there was a gap between the role of the army and politicians. The section will also assess whether there was a perception that civilian control over foreign affairs and domestic matters frustrated or impinged on the military task.

*Are the Pakistan Armed Forces a “professional army?”*

1.1.1 Expertise

Huntington defines expertise as “specialized knowledge and skill acquired through education and experience.” According to Stephen C. Cohen, the Pakistan Armed Forces first started to exhibit these characteristics in 1955 when Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact, a Cold War alliance between Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The Pact was organized largely by the US and exposed the Pakistani army to American military training, doctrine and “approaches to problem-solving.” Between 1955 and 1958, for instance, over 200

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45. Finer, The Man on Horseback, 189.

46. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 8.


48. Ibid.
Pakistani artillery officers attended American institutions.\footnote{49. Ibid.} This training abroad was coupled with frequent visits by American nuclear and military experts to the Command and Staff College in Quetta, Pakistan.\footnote{50. Ibid.} Cohen recounts reviewing official college documents, noting that the visits by Americans “proved most useful and resulted in modification and revision of the old syllabus” to become consistent with the “fresh data” provided by the US.\footnote{51. Ibid.}

The Pakistani Armed Forces recommitted to professionalism after a crushing defeat against India in 1971.\footnote{52. Ibid.} The Chief of the Army Staff, General Mohammed Zia ul-haq established the National Defence University (NDU) in Islamabad “to impart higher education in policy and strategy formulation at various tiers with emphasis on national security and defence, and act as a national think tank.”\footnote{53. Ibid., 106.} Leading up to the 1999 coup, NDU’s program for colonels and brigadiers comprised of two courses: the War Course and the National Defence Course. Both “acted as a ladder for promotion to the tank of two star major generals.”\footnote{54. Ibid.}

The Pakistan Army also offers physical training and courses on desert warfare, equitation and high altitude combat.\footnote{55. Ibid.} The Army has twelve training centers including the School of Armour and Mechanized Warfare in Nowshera, the School of Artillery in Nowshera, the Military College of Engineering in Risalpur, the Military College of Signals in Rawalpindi and the School of Infantry and Tactics in Quetta.\footnote{56. Ibid.}

Cohen notes that this expertise and training is often used to justify military intervention in politics. He recalls a 2001 interview with a major general responsible for “one of Pakistan’s key military training institutions” who said, “We are recruited and promoted on the basis of merit, we go to many schools such as this one, we have to pass a serious of tough tests, and

\begin{itemize}
\item 49. Ibid.
\item 50. Ibid.
\item 51. Ibid.
\item 52. Ibid., 106.
\item 54. Shah, The Army, 201.
\item 56. Ibid.
\end{itemize}
only the best of us reach higher rank.” He added that politicians do not require formal education to attain public office.

Therefore, for the purpose of Finer’s framework, it is reasonable to conclude that the Pakistani military possesses a degree of specialized knowledge in military and security matters. This being said, further avenues of research may consider the effectiveness of Pakistan’s military education and training and the usefulness to soldiers in combat.

1.1.2 Social responsibility towards the state

A sense of responsibility towards the client is a key characteristic of any profession. In the case of the Pakistani Armed Forces, interviews with former generals illustrate a keen sense of social responsibility towards the Pakistani state. Following the 1999 coup, for instance, General Musharraf, declared that the “Pakistan Army has accepted the challenge to assist the nation in these trying and uncertain conditions.” He further added that “the spirit of loyalty is instilled deeply in all ranks of the army... At the senior command level, there is a larger sense of loyalty to a common cause or toward the protection of the nation.”

Similarly, in his 1994 army training document, Col. Saifi Ahmad Naqvi noted that the army is responsible for the “defence of the country,” including “safeguarding the integrity, territorial boundaries, and the ideological frontiers to which the country owes its existence.” Naqvi’s document was published in the Pakistan Army Green Book, a guide to training and motivate new army recruits. According to Cohen, such training is a key factor in instilling an “undeniable patriotism and commitment to the people of Pakistan” within the Pakistan Army.

This commitment is demonstrated through the Pakistani army’s role in nation-building and disaster relief activities. That is to say, the military has actively aided the civil authority in

58. Ibid.
61. Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 139.
62. Ibid.
64. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, 126.
responding to domestic issues throughout Pakistani history, including managing communal riots in 1950, 1952, 1954, as well as distributing aid and providing security during floods, food shortages, famine and infectious disease outbreaks, throughout Pakistan’s history. In 1992, for instance, The Times, a British newspaper, reported that Indus river floods “illustrated how much Pakistan depends on the armed forces in times of crisis. The corps of engineers mobilised all its resources to save the irrigation barriers while civilian agencies dithered and squabbled.”

1.1.3 Corporate unity

According to Ayesha Siddiqa, the Pakistani military’s professional training, ethnic homogeneity and unity against India contribute to its corporate ethos. She notes that these factors combined, “provide the essential bonding, especially among the officers, that give the organization the appearance of a monolithic force.”

In terms of ethnicity, for instance, the Pakistani Army is largely Punjabi. In 1990, Punjabis constituted 65% of the army. Pashtuns followed with 14% representation, Sindhis and Baluchis constituted 15%, Kashmiris represented 6% and other minority groups represented a mere 0.3%. Cohen notes that the heavy representation of Punjabis is primarily a function of the size of the Punjab, its military tradition, and its high education levels. Indeed, over half of the Pakistani population lives in Punjab. This high concentration of Punjabis, while representative of Pakistan’s demographics, nonetheless had created a public perception that the military is an “exclusive club” for the Punjabis. Many minority groups, including Bengalis in East Pakistan, felt excluded and underrepresented by the armed forces, which regarded them as being unfit to join the ranks. As noted by C. Christine Fair, it is this feeling of exclusion and Punjabi domination that eventually gave rise to the separation of East Pakistan in 1971.

68. Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 570.
70. Nations Encyclopaedia, “Pakistan,” nationsencyclopedia.com
72. Ibid., 83
73. Ibid.
In addition to ethnic homogeneity, the perceived threat from India acts as a “unifying force” for the military and “gives it its professional essence.”\textsuperscript{74} Musharraf’s insistence on continuing to fight against India during the Kargil War is an excellent example because it received broad support from the military and further distinguished the army’s goals and interests from those of the civilian authorities.\textsuperscript{75}

These examples illustrate that the Pakistan Army does in fact, meet Finer’s condition of a professional army. It possesses expertise in the use of force, instils social responsibility in its leadership, and has a strong corporate identity stemming from its ethnic make-up and adversarial relationship with India.

1.2 Did professionalism contribute to the military’s decision to launch the 1999 coup?\textsuperscript{9}

1.2.1 Gap between role and responsibility of the army and politicians

According to Finer, professionalism impels the army into politics because it creates a gap between the armed forces and politicians whereby politicians are charged with policy-making while the armed forces control the use of force.\textsuperscript{76} The argument is that having a gap creates the possibility for mistrust and animosity which could lead one to intervene into the others’ domain. This is in contrast to the “old regimes” where the aristocracy had full control of both policy-making and the use of force, which left little room for intervention.

Article 245 of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan clearly articulates the gap between the armed forces and the civil authority. It notes that “the Armed Forces shall, under the directions of the Federal Government, defend Pakistan against external aggression or threat of war, and subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so.”\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{74} Shah, \textit{The Army}, 209.
\textsuperscript{75} Ali, “Contradiction of Concordance Theory,” 545.
\textsuperscript{76} Finer, \textit{The Man on Horseback}, 188-189.
1.2.2 Perception that politician’s control over foreign affairs and domestic matters frustrates and impinges on the military task

This condition was perhaps the most important factor in the military’s decision to execute the coup in 1999. As noted by Siddiqua, Nawaz Sharif had decided to negotiate a peace deal with India to end the Kargil War.\textsuperscript{78} Siddiqua argues that this decision, aimed at creating long-term peace with Pakistan’s arch rival, challenged the military’s very \textit{raison d’être}, thereby instigating extreme opposition from the military.\textsuperscript{79}

Indeed, Musharraf’s writings illustrate the extent to which the military believed that Sharif’s decision impinged on its task of gaining control of Kashmir. He writes:

“The Kargil episode created the biggest divide between the prime minister and myself. We had both wanted to put Kashmir firmly on the world’s radar screen, politically as well as militarily. The Kargil initiative succeeded in doing so. Yet when external political pressure forced Nawaz Sharif to vacate the liberated area, he broke down...it was in dealing with Kargil that the prime minister exposed his mediocrity and set himself on a collision course with the army and me.”\textsuperscript{80}

These examples not only demonstrate that the Pakistani army does, in fact, fit the definition of a professional army, but they also show that professionalism contributed to the army’s decision to launch the 1999 coup by creating a gap between the army and politicians and by fuelling the perception that the Sharif government was disrupting the military’s task. It can therefore be concluded that the first of Finer’s conditions, the professionalization of the officer corps, holds for the Pakistani case.

Results and Data Analysis for Condition 2

\textit{Rise of nationalism and the nation-state}

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\textsuperscript{78} Siddiqua, \textit{Military Inc.}, 96.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 97.
\textsuperscript{80} Musharraf, \textit{In Line of Fire}, 136-137
The second condition of military intervention is the rise of nationalism and the nation-state.\textsuperscript{81} Finer argues that nationalism contributes to military intervention if the armed forces become a visible symbol and pledge of nationhood, if the military ideology and programme are based on nationalism and if the nation is the object of military loyalty.\textsuperscript{82}

2.1 Armed Forces as visible symbol and pledge of nationhood

The Armed Forces first became a symbol of Pakistani nationhood under the dictatorship of President Ayub Khan who executed Pakistan’s first military coup in 1958.\textsuperscript{83} According to Cohen, Ayub Khan glorified the army in order to promote a Pakistani national identity and ideology strong enough to withstand a variety of perceived threats, including the countervailing influence of Indian nationalism and the self-interest of individual Pakistani provinces.\textsuperscript{84}

This process followed Benedict Anderson’s concept of “imagined communities” because Ayub Khan in fact employed state-controlled media, textbooks, and even privately own businesses to promote the image of a “monolithic Muslim community.”\textsuperscript{85} Anderson notes that political elites often use such means to create a sense of nationhood in societies where there is no common language or lineage, as is the case with Pakistan with its multi-lingual, multi-ethnic make-up.\textsuperscript{86} Alan B. Simmons calls this an “imagined future” whereby policy-makers use national identity as a tool to advance a broader political agenda for their country, often to consolidate their own power.\textsuperscript{87}

In Pakistan, this process continued into the 1970s when following the separation of East Pakistan, the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto introduced a new national education policy aimed at “building national cohesion.”\textsuperscript{88} The policy included a compulsory course entitled

\textsuperscript{81} Finer, The Man on Horseback, 189.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{83} Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, 67.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{87} Alan B. Simmons, Immigration and Canada: Global and Transnational Perspectives (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press Inc, 2010), 16.
“Pakistan Studies” for all students in grade 9 and 10. Naureen Durrani recounts that course textbooks were filled with images of the military and teachers were encouraged to “represent the army as a central symbol of national identity.” She adds that when asked to draw an image of “us,” (i.e. Pakistanis) the majority of male students in Durrani’s study drew illustrations of either weapons, bombs, army helicopters, soldiers or the banner of Nishan-e-Haider (the highest military honour in Pakistan). As forecasted by Finer’s framework, this example illustrates that the Pakistani public started to view the military as an essential component of what it means to be Pakistani. The consequence, as Finer predicted, was that the military started to “attract esteem.”

2.2 Military ideology and programme based on nationalism

Finer argues that nationalism often provides the military with an ideology and programme promoting the military as the “guardian of the national territory.” Musharraf’s rationale for the coup illustrates Finer’s argument because, in Musharraf’s view, the military was acting to preserve the sovereignty of the country. For instance, in his address to the nation on the night of the coup, Musharraf stated, “Dear Brothers and Sisters, your Armed Forces have never and will never let you down insha’Allah. We shall preserve the integrity and the sovereignty of our country to the last drop of our blood.” This idea of “guarding the national territory” became the cornerstone of Musharraf’s vision for Pakistan. Following the coup, for instance, he introduced the slogan “Pakistan First,” which aimed at creating a national identity based on a commitment to preserve the state.

2.3 Military loyalty to the nation
Finer argues that military is more likely to intervene in politics if its loyalty is directed towards the nation-state, rather than the civil government.\footnote{Finer, The Man on Horseback, 189.} That is to say, the military may perceive a “duty to be disloyal to the government” in order to preserve the integrity of the nation.\footnote{Ibid.}

This condition is applicable to the 1999 military coup in Pakistan because Musharraf repeatedly expressed his allegiance to the state as more important than his duty towards the government. For example, he explained his decision to undermine the Constitution by stating “The choice was between saving the body- that is the nation, at the cost of losing a limb- which is the Constitution, or saving the limb and losing the whole body. The Constitution is but a part of the nation, therefore I chose to save the nation.”\footnote{“General Pervez Musharraf’s Address to the Nation,” fas.org http://fas.org/news/pakistan/1999/991017-mushraf_speech.htm (accessed November 18, 2015).}

Aqil Shah notes that the “army’s messianic mission to resuscitate the nation” was engrained into the top level of army officials.\footnote{Shah, The Army, 203.} Major General Asif Duraiz Akhtar, for instance, writes:

A focal point of the Army’s role in nation-building must be that of a surgeon, who has to make hard decisions on behalf of the patient for saving his life, including amputation if required. Those decisions will bother some who have vested interests…but the condition of the patient warrants such bold actions.\footnote{Major General Asif Duraiz Akhtar, “National-Building,” in Pakistan Army Green Book (2000): 2.}

It can be concluded that the rise of nationalism laid the foundation for military intervention because the military increasingly regarded itself as the “custodian of the nation’s values,” thereby prioritizing the perceived interest of the nation above the authority of the elected government.\footnote{Finer, The Man on Horseback189}
Results and Data Analysis for Condition 3

The substitution for the divine authority of kings of the dogma of popular sovereignty

Finer observes that people are the sole source of legitimacy in republican regimes, as compared to monarchies.\textsuperscript{103} In other words, both elected governments and the military are subordinate to the opinions of the electorate.\textsuperscript{104} He argues that this recognition of popular sovereignty could lead to military intervention in politics if the military claims to represent the will of the people.\textsuperscript{105}

3.1 Military plea that it embodies the sovereignty of the people

In his memoir, Musharraf explains that the coup was executed on behalf of the Pakistani people. He writes that “… (the current) state of affairs left people disillusioned. Pakistanis started losing faith in their country. The young, in particular, were despondent. I had my work cut out for me.”\textsuperscript{106}

While Musharraf implies that the military represented the will of the “disillusioned people,” other military officers argue that the people were not aware of what was in their best interest. Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, for instance, stated that the due to their lack of education, “the electorate finds it easy to be manipulated and identifies itself more with representatives from their own ill-educated stock.”\textsuperscript{107} Finer’s framework accounts for this variation because Finer notes that while the intervener many not represent the “actual observed will of the people, he (may claim) to represent its ‘real’ will- what is in its true interest, or what represents its higher morality.”\textsuperscript{108}

Results and Data Analysis for Condition 4

Insurrectionary Armies

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 189-190.  
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{106} Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 148.  
\textsuperscript{107} Shah, The Army, 193.  
\textsuperscript{108} Finer, The Man on Horseback, 190.
Insurrectionary armies are prone to intervention because they exist to “liberate the national territory or the overthrow of the social order.” Finer notes that the leaders of such armies tend to become political rulers in an ensuing new social order, which then sets a precedent for military involvement in politics.

4.1 Military history of working for the liberation of the national territory

This measure does not apply in the Pakistan case because the “national Pakistani territory” did not exist at the time of independence. Instead, both the Pakistani territory and the military were created when the British Indian Empire was divided into two states: the Dominion of Pakistan and the Union of India. Indeed, as noted by Veena Kukreja, “there was little military organization to speak of when Pakistan was created in 1947, as the old British Indian army had to be unscrambled and reorganised into fresh units.”

Because of the inapplicability of this one particular measure, one may be led to question the appropriateness of Finer’s entire framework to the Pakistani case. That, however, would not be justifiable. A more reasonable conclusion, as evidenced by this example, is that depending on the specific context and circumstances, it is the combination, not the necessarily the entirety, of Finer’s conditions that can trigger military interventions.

4.2 Military history of working for the overthrow of social order

Although the Pakistani military has not worked for the liberation of the national territory, it does have a long history of working for the overthrow of social order. The 1999 military coup, for instance, was the third time the democratically elected civilian government was toppled by the military. This tradition is summarized by former chief General Jehangir Karamat who states that “Whenever there is a breakdown in...stability, as has happened frequently in Pakistan, the military translates its potential into the will to dominate, and we

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109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111. Kukreja, Civil-Military Relations, 46.
112. Aziz, Military Control, 1.
have military intervention followed by military rule.”\(^{113}\) Indeed, Kukreja notes that “Pakistan has essentially been ruled by men in uniform for approximately 24 years during the 43.5 years of its existence.\(^{114}\)

Despite its tradition of intervention, however, Pakistan’s army does not qualify as an insurrectionary army because according to Finer, insurrectionary armies intervene in politics because “this is why they have come into existence.”\(^ {115}\) In other words, “nationhood and revolution come at the bequest of the army.” As noted previously, the Pakistan army was created to “defend Pakistan against external aggression;” not to liberate the nation or create a new social order.\(^ {116}\) Therefore, the condition of insurrectionary armies does not hold for the case of Pakistan.

Results and Data Analysis for Condition 5

**The emergence of new, independent states**

Finer argues that new states often breed nationalism and exacerbate existing economic, ethnic and religious cleavages.\(^ {117}\) If these factors lead to a call for a strong, central government, then the military may be inclined to intervene to provide such a service.\(^ {118}\)

5.1 Independence from colonialism

Pakistan was formed as a country on August 14\(^{th}\) 1947, following the Partition of India in the aftermath of the end of the British colonial period in India. India was separated into East and West Pakistan at the insistence of the Muslim League during the British Raj.\(^ {119}\) Political groups like the Muslim League, which were mostly comprised of the elites of Indian Muslim
community, feared that they would be unable to exercise power as a minority within a united India.¹²⁰

As Cohen notes, the Partition resulted in a clear “underdog mentality” among the Pakistani political elite which fuelled its “desire to disprove Indian predictions that their state would fail.”¹²¹ On occasion, this mentality has spilled over into pre-emptive Pakistani military aggression, particularly in the case Kashmir, a contested territory between India and Pakistan.¹²²

As noted by Hassan Abbas, the “Kashmir conflict landed Pakistan in a security dilemma” whereby the military budget and leadership of the Armed Forces became essential to realize the claim over Kashmir.¹²³ The military thus became an essential player in Pakistan’s foreign policy- to the point that Musharraf was able to launch an unprovoked attack against India in 1999, without prior approval from Sharif.

Cohen also explains that Pakistan experienced severe economic instability and a lack of industry and resources following the Partition.¹²⁴ This resulted in an influx of foreign aid and economic support from Western countries including the United States.¹²⁵ Cohen notes that Pakistan received significant “military assistance in the form of grants and aid (weapons sold at concessional rates, or with reduced interest).”¹²⁶ This aid helped to strengthen the army and consequently, facilitated its ability to intervene in politics through successful coups.

5.2 Emergence of economic, ethnic and religious cleavages

Pakistan experienced economic uncertainty, as well as ethnic and sectarian conflict leading up to the 1999 coup. For example, annual gross domestic product growth had fallen to

¹²⁰ Ibid.
¹²¹ Ibid., 55
¹²² Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terror, (Amonke: An East Gate Book, 2005), 17.
¹²³ Ibid.
¹²⁴ Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, 55.
¹²⁵ Ibid.
¹²⁶ Ibid.
3%. This contributed to wide-spread poverty and inequality within the population, which was further exacerbated by Prime Minister Sharif’s decision to encourage state-owned banks to loan money to his supporters. The decision resulted in $3.5 billion in default loans. The economic outlook worsened in 1998 when following nuclear tests, Pakistan was the target of heavy U.S. sanctions.

Pakistan has also experienced significant ethnic and sectarian violence since independence including the separation of East Pakistan in 1971, an insurgency in Baluchistan in 1973, communal violence between the Muhajir and the Sindhis in the 1980s and conflict between the Sunni majority and Shiite minority in the 1990s. Sectarian violence between the Sunni majority and Shiite minority peaked in the 1970s when the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought an influx of weapons into Pakistan. The country experienced 581 deaths and over 1,600 injuries related to religious violence between 1990 and 1997.

This backdrop yet again points the relevance of Finer’s framework: poor economic conditions and ethnic conflicts result in “passionate nationalism,” which in turns creates the pre-conditions for the military to propel itself into the political sphere.

5.3 Call for a strong, central government after independence

Muhammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, introduced “a highly centralised constitutional system” that placed politicians under “bureaucratic tutelage and afforded extraordinary powers to the Governor-General” over provincial governments. According to Iftikar Malik, this “weak tradition of party politics,” resulted in politicians being subservient to

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128. Ibid.
129. Ibid.
130. Ibid.
131. Hossain, “Pakistan’s October 1999,” 45-46. The Muhajirs are Urdu-speaking immigrants from India that settled primarily in the major Sindhi cities. Many scholars, including Veena Kukreja argue that Pakistan’s ethnic conflicts resulted largely from “resentment towards Punjabi domination” by minority groups. While this is true for cases such as East Pakistan, it can be argued that the Musharraf-era signifies a break from this narrative as Musharraf, a Muhajir, and was able to topple a predominately Punjabi government led by Nawaz Sharif, who was Punjabi himself.
133. Ibid., 53.
the bureaucracy, and later to the military as it became increasingly involved in politics. Hasan Askari Rizvi adds that the need for a strong, central government, rather than “participatory political institutions” created an environment favourable to military intervention as the military was not only seen as a symbol of nationhood but it also possessed a certain coercive power necessary to create a strong government.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the measure generally holds for Pakistan. This being said it is difficult to measure the extent to which it contributed to the 1999 coup. It could be argued, for instance, that Musharraf was not interested in pursuing a “strong, central government,” because his “seven-point plan” for Pakistan included “devolving power to the grassroots.” In this regard, it is fair to state that the inability to draw clear causal linkages through statistical analysis is a limitation of this paper.

The following table summarizes the findings of this section, showing that thirteen out of fourteen measures applied to the Pakistani case:

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136. Iftikhar H. Malik, “The Military coup in Pakistan: Business as usual or democracy on hold!” The Round Table 90, no. 360, 360.
137. Hasan Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000) p.1
138. Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 149.
Table 2: Summary of findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition 1: Professionalization of the officer corps</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Are the Pakistan Armed Forces a “professional” military?</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expertise: Specialized knowledge and skill acquired through education and experience</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social responsibility towards the state</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate unity: Sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group part from laymen</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Did professionalism contribute to the military’s decision to launch the 1999 coup?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gap between role and responsibility of the army and politicians</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception that politicians’ control over foreign affairs and domestic matters frustrates and impinges on the military task</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition 2: Rise of nationalism and the nation-state</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces as visible symbol and pledge of nationhood</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military ideology and programme based on nationalism</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military loyalty to the nation</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition 3: The substitution for the divine authority of kings of the dogma of popular sovereignty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military plea that it embodies the sovereignty of the people</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition 4: Insurrectionary armies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military history of working for the liberation of the national territory</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military history of working for the overthrow of social order</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition 5: The emergence of new, independent states</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent independence from colonialism</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergence of economic, ethnic and religious cleavages</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call for a strong, central government after independence</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

This paper set out to explore if Finer’s framework holds true for the case of the 1999 military coup in Pakistan. The data revealed that to a large extent it does, except for one measure for one of the framework’s condition: military history of working for the liberation of the national territory. That is to say, the conditions of the professionalization of the officer corps, the rise of nationalism and the nation-state, the substitution for the divine authority of kings of the dogma of popularity, and the emergence of new, independent states were all applicable to the 1999 military coup in Pakistan. However, condition four, entitled by Finer as “insurrectionary armies,” was not fully met because the Pakistan Army was not directly involved in the liberation of the national territory. This implies that military intervention in politics is not always or necessarily attributable to the five conditions outlined by Finer. In Pakistan, the military was able to intervene, even though the circumstances surrounding intervention did not fully prescribe to Finer’s framework.

That having said, the fact that thirteen out of fourteen measures of Finer’s framework leads the paper to sufficiently conclude that the framework is a useful tool to explain and enhance the academic study of the 1999 military coup in Pakistan. The findings of this paper are therefore relevant to the field of civil-military relations because they illustrate that Finer’s framework has applicability beyond the 1960s coups examined in The Man on Horseback. Further research may include a comparison of the conditions surrounding the 1999 military coup against those surrounding present-day Pakistan. Such a comparison could help assess whether Pakistan is likely to experience a military coup in the coming years.

Bibliography

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