

What They Wrote About World War II: The *Journal of Marketing* 1939-1946

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Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of the paper is to shed light on what was written about marketing issues during World War II as a contribution of marketing historiography and as a call for further research in understanding the origin and development of marketing concepts.

Methodology/approach – Content analysis was applied to war time articles and materials appearing in the *Journal of Marketing* between 1939-1946.

Findings – The study offers 7 major findings: 1. Movement of marketing concepts away from economic theory; 2. The call for the development of marketing research not the continuation of “market research;” 3. The importance of public policy matters as a result of the Great Depression and World War II; 4. The use of comparative and historical materials in discussions; 5. The presence of a “free market” orientation; 6. The importance of personal experiences and involvement in public policy; and 7. A “long run” perspective in terms of planning going beyond the firm itself.

Implications/limitations – The study provides evidence about what marketing academics, business people, and government officials saw as marketing's role in World II and in the post war era. It provides a comprehensive approach to examining a variety of eras of marketing thought. The study is limited to a single source; the research does not provide information about the authors' affiliations, backgrounds, and perspectives.

Originality/value of the paper – The study differs from the standard reporting of “what has been published” by examining the content of the materials. It offers a different approach to “literature reviews” because it is comprehensive and thematically focused for a defined period. It applies historiographic methods to marketing.

Key words – Marketing history, historiography, World War II, history of marketing thought, *Journal of Marketing*

Paper type – Research paper

Introduction

This is a work of historiography, “the study of the shape of evidence” for historical writing (Conley in Certeau 1988: viii). The study concentrates on materials from a single source which were not developed as historical writing but nevertheless represent evidence for historiographical analysis (Iggers 1984). The choice of World War II stems from my interest in the effects of dramatic environmental changes on marketing. The period 1939-1946 had earthquake like qualities much like the events of 1906 in San Francisco. “There was tension building in the rock masses on either side of the San Andreas Fault, and then, the release which accompanied and followed the terrifying readjustment” (Ladure 1987: 288). The first purpose of the study is to add to the discussions of historiography in marketing (Fiat 1987; Fullerton 1988; Smith and Lux 1993; Savitt 2000; Witkowski and Jones 2008; Savitt 2009). The secondary purpose is to develop an understanding of the marketing literature during World War II as a prospectus for a study of marketing practices in the period (Tadajewski 2009). The work continues historiographical studies published in the journal although it goes beyond a quantitative listing of articles and examines their contents (Applebaum 1947, 1952, 1958; Grether 1976; Kerin 1996). The present research examines original materials in the *Journal of Marketing (JM)*. The journal published abstracts and notes of articles, communications, research, reviews and university research related to World War II. These were drawn from a number of academic, business and government sources; among the academic journals were the *Harvard Business Review*, *Journal of Business of the University of Chicago*, and the *Journal of Retailing*. These materials offer another vector for understanding what was written about marketing during the period and what the editors thought important for readers.

The study has limitations stemming including the choice of materials, the study period, and the use of a single source as well as from the arbitrary nature of content analysis. How much content to include is a contestable issue and alas decisions are subjective. Grether described the difficulties starting with the need to use broad subject matter categories and times periods, “allowances must be made for differences in purposeful judgments and value systems” and “consequently, allowances must be made for some amount of fallibility” (Grether 1976: 64). References to events such as World War I or the First World War have been simplified with contemporary usage and spelling except in quotations. I have tried to focus on what was written and not engage in writing history neither engaging in counterfactual analysis or prediction of the authors' ideas (Becker 1938). In several places brief background statements have been included. In summary, every attempt has been made to represent substance of the materials and present the findings and not engage in presenting what I “would have liked to have discovered,” but what was discovered.

Methodology

The methodology has three steps. The initial step defined the study period to 1939 to 1946. It was based on the assumption that it would include all of the wartime writings in the journal and was arbitrary (Hollander, Rassuli, Jones, and Dix 2005). The study includes articles and communications between July 1939 and June 1946 with one exception of one article published in 1947 which was part of series whose previous parts had been published within the period (Alexander 1947). The design is similar to work by historians of the period (Schuyler 1944; Winkler 2002). This approach was used in a study of the contents of the *Harvard Business Review* during the Korean conflict (Spector 2006).

The second step described the landscape, a demanding activity requiring the development of an understanding of the economic, political, and social elements of the United States in the period leading up to the war, the Great Depression, and the war itself (Gaddis 2002). From the end of World War I to the start of the study period, America had adopted economic and political isolation and was not prepared for the war as can be seen in the history of the times (Kennedy 1999; Perrett 1985). American entry in the war meant “business as usual” would no longer exist. Measures, unprecedented in American history were introduced including “price-fixing of a vast range of commodities, at the manufacturing, wholesaling and retail levels, stabilization of rental rates in defense areas; freezing of wages in skilled trades, a system of rationing for the most important consumer goods; share increases in taxation, a system of pulling war bonds out of income” (Jacoby 1942: 290). And, with significant consequences including, “the manager or owner will cease to be boss” (Jacoby 1942: 294). The results of this step are not explicitly reported but help to place the materials in their context. It was tempting to provide greater analysis about the effects of World War I and the Great Depression on what was written during this period, however, that would have moved the boundaries too far. The study is about what the literature of the period offered not the history of the period.

The third step applied content analysis to the 327 articles in the *JM*; these included traditional academic articles, communications from American Marketing Association meetings, sponsored contributions and proceedings published in the journal. They are referred to as “articles” as a means of simplification; there was no indication of what if any review processes were used. Of the total, 103 were classified as “war related” based on three criteria. One, the word “war” was included in the title; two, if not in the title the “war” was mentioned in the first two paragraphs of the text; and, three, if the article's theme discussed wartime policies or programs such as articles that used “national emergency” and “planning for an emergency,” terms used prior to the United State's formal entry in World War II. Each of the 103, including one outside of the study period, was carefully read a minimum of 4 times as a means of creating topical categories. An *a priori* 75% rule-of-thumb was applied to define the core topics. Although single topics were identified, most included references to other war time issues. The first pass led to 8 categories, a second to 7, and the final to 6. These are shown in Table 1. The task was challenging and arbitrary decisions were required. For example, one piece on price control in Europe was placed in the “contemplating the war” category even when a case for including it public policy could be easily made. The other 224 articles not meeting the criteria may have contained discussions of war time issues. To check for omissions, 10 articles from the study period were sampled at random, none met the war time criteria.

**War Related Articles in the *Journal of Marketing*,
Topics by Volume (years July1939--April1946)**

Topics	Vol.4	Vol. 5	Vol. 6	Vol. 7	Vol. 8	Vol. 9	Vol. 10	Total	Percent
Contemplating the War	6		1	1				8	9.7
Wartime Marketing		1	11	1	2	1	1	17	16.5
Consumers and Markets			3	2	5	1		11	10.7
Marketing Institutions		4	2		4	2	1	13	12.6
Postwar Planning				8	10	6	7	31	30.1
Price Control and Rationing		1	3	5	7	3	4	23	22.3
Total War Related	6	6	20	17	28	13	13	103	100.0
Total Articles	63	49	76	37	45	33	24	327	100.0
Percent War Related	9.5	12.2	26.3	45.9	62.2	39.3	54.1		31.5

Table 1.
War Related
Articles in the
*Journal of
Marketing*

The dominating theme in each topic is as follows: Contemplating the War--discussions of foreign experiences with war time adjustments going back to World War I as well as those that were currently being experienced in Europe since 1939; it also includes articles considering what would have to be done domestically "if America should enter the war." Wartime Marketing--descriptions of how marketing firms are adapting to the wartime conditions except for price control and rationing. Consumers and Markets--discussions of changes in consumer behavior as a result of the war and wartime programs. Marketing Institutions includes discussions of changes in wholesale and retail trade; while Postwar Planning--proposals for marketing's role in preparing for the postwar economy at the firm, community and national levels are presented. Price Control and Rationing--discussions and evaluations of public policy matters affecting marketing and the economy. Because of their extent and importance, they are discussed in a special section. The list of the 103 articles by topic are in Appendix I. References to these in the text are noted by "*" after the author's name.

Findings

The findings are divided into 3, general findings, findings from the first 5 categories, and findings from price control and rationing. There are 7 general findings. 1. Marketing analysis was based on economic theory, however, there is the emergence of marketing analysis in its own right. 2. Public policy issues dominate the discussions in ways not thought of today, reaching to fiscal and monetary policies. 3. There is a strong philosophical perspective based on the "free market system." 4. Historical and comparative materials are used to document marketing's past. 5. There is emphasis on "the long run" with regard to the role of marketing's role in planning in the post war period. 6. Much of the exposition is based on personal experiences and on-going research. 7. There is a strong call for the development and improvement of marketing data and research methods as a key for the expansion of the emerging discipline.

Contemplating the War

Two themes dominate *Contemplating the War*. The first theme based on 4 articles provides historical analyses of changes in European marketing in the interwar period, 1914-1939. They offer insights about marketing practices from the end of World War I to the start of the war in Europe in 1939 (Allen* 1943; Furth* 1940; Thomas* 1940; Wolff* 1940). Acknowledging that conditions in America are different, they offer insights about changes that might take place in the run up to the war. The second theme addresses what American business will face when the United States enters the war, couched in the euphemistic "impending national emergency." Weld's comment is typical "A real

emergency would exist, of course, if we were drawn into the war” and then provides recommendations for the type of research that will be necessary to support the war effort and planning for the post war period (Weld* 1940: 54). Rutherford, an Army Colonel and Director of Planning for the War Department, evaluates the strategic procurement policies that the government had been developing as part of the lend-lease agreements with Great Britain (Rutherford* 1940). Hobart offered his views about how marketing functions might change during the war. “It is true that certain well established marketing practices may be modified or eliminated and others might assume a more important place in *the picture*” (Hobart* 1940: 61). *The authors are generally guarded about the effects of the war, concluding t that it will have important effects on marketing but hesitating to describe them and in providing insights as how to manage them.*

Wartime Marketing

The 16 articles in the Wartime Marketing category offer few examples of expected changes in marketing activities except for sales promotion. Half focus on learning how to sell to the government as well as the promotion of victory bonds (Hurley 1941; Lockley 1942; Millard 1942; Tosdal 1942; Weld 1942; Jones 1943; Osborne 1943; Wheeler 1943). One illustrated “effective marketing policies” in which “Experts, including marketing men, have laid a sound basis for a scientific approach to the problem of psychological war fare in the course we face today” (Bernays* 1942: 244). Gragg in an 1941 piece set the stage “Marketing and the Defense Program. He began with a comprehensive review of what happened to marketing in the “Great War” between 1914 and 1918. The thesis was clear “There is no use in beating around the bush: Selling will not continue as usual, and marketing executives must in large measure lay aside certain ways of thinking and turn the cultivation of other modes of approach” (Gragg* 1941: 424). What was proposed was a systematic approach in which “marketing executives are expected to show self-restraint in their determination of prices consistent with the best public interest” and “with the longer run well-being of the nation—the problem of preparing for the post emergency period” (Gragg 1941*: 427, 429). His program was based on Spinoza’s “Do not weep. Do not wax indignant. Understand” and it described 4 managerial propositions. One, defense programs require a change in the mode of operation, not a total abandonment of past practices with a realization that defense orders can be just as profitable even though less reliable; two, product differentiation must be given over to standardization and simplification which can have long run effects on efficiency and profitability; three, advertising will be reversed in which the buyer will be attempting to influence sellers to obtain desired goods; and four, allocation decisions will require a clear understanding of priorities.

Consumers and Markets

The articles in Consumers and Markets illustrate marketing’s reliance on macroeconomic theory for the analysis of consumer markets using metrics such as the increase in domestic employment, the growth of per capita income, shifts in income distribution patterns, changes in market structure, increases in the standard of living, and the consequences of pent up demand on inflation. An early piece speculates about the effects of increasing income among civilians on food purchasing patterns noting that the changes will depend on total income payments as well as income distribution. “However, we have no data to show how long it does take newcomers [to higher income classes] to adjust themselves to the pattern of the class they have just entered” (Erdman* 1942: 26). One finding is “In less than two years of war we have witnessed a change from a buyer’s market to a seller’s market in a large number of consumer items. This came about because of the rapidly increasing purchasing power of the people outstripped by a declining supply of goods. This violent disruption of a normally delicate balance between supply and demand has created new values and markets” (Watson* 1942: 231). Attention was paid to the decline in consumer credit and how that might affect the purchase of consumer durables especially those not affected by rationing (Lee* 1944). “It seems almost certain that the volume of consumer credit will continue its downward course for some time and will not reverse direction for an extended period until the war is over” (Robinson* 1943: 349).

A major theme is the need for the advancement of market research to better understand consumer as “markets” but not individual consumer behavior research as we now know it (Cherington*1942; Erdman * 1943). One panel study concluded that more substantive information was required to understand income changes that resulted from “1. Those serving with armed forces. 2. Those engaged in war industries. 3. The general public changed by the war from what it used to be” (Crossely* 1943a: 357). Another concluded “War conditions tend to introduce new or abnormal trends” (Barton* 1943:

52). Income effects were perplexing and indicated the creation of a new “middle class” (Crossely* 1943b: 42). One of the larger panel studies sponsored by the United States Chamber of Commerce attempted determine what consumers would purchase based on their current inventory, “wear-out patterns, cash, and the desire to purchase, if the war ended tomorrow” from which they concluded “this war, like wars generally will terminate with very unequal expansion in different parts of the economy, and with very uneven shifts in all walks of endeavor” (Moll* 1943: 54). The final conclusions were expressed in aggregate terms that went far beyond than consumer behavior. 1. We will have the greatest plant capacity in our future. 2. We will have the best sources of raw materials in our history. 3. We will have the largest skilled work force. 4. There will be great pent-up demand ever seen. 5. There will be the largest “banked-up” savings to satisfy consumer demand in our history (Crossely* 1943b).

Two articles the importance of consumer credit, one argues for better governmental management of consumer credit during the remaining war years, those past 1943, with due recognition of the downward path of demand for consumer credit until after the war and the implications for its resurgence once the war is over (Neifeld* 1943; Robinson* 1943). Others provide evidence of the changes in income levels and distribution, population shifts, deferred demand and savings and living standards for the 1940 to 1943 period. They are generally descriptive without a systematic development of what the long run might bring (Smith and Himmel* 1945). The major insight is the tendency of purchasing power to lag behind productive capacity and the ability of maintaining high levels of purchasing power after the war especially as production returns to consumer goods (McFall* 1943).

Marketing Institutions

Applebaum discusses possible changes in marketing institutions, with cautious assumptions about the inevitability of the war, does speculate about what it might bring “we believe it is not likely to happen next year” although he makes references to on-going changes including the unionization of chain stores, the expansion of supermarkets and the increase of self-service throughout retailing that may be affected (Applebaum* 1941: 438). Nystrom in 1941 provides similar analysis of events although he muses about how the retail trades under the national defense policies, if adopted, will have to keep “consumers supplied with the goods they need and want at reasonable price levels” (Nystrom* 1941: 220). Only Engle in that year offers a definitive discussion various war time which might affect marketing institutions. The underlying causes to him were “defense orders” which solidify the transition from a sellers' market to a buyers' market. “As defense becomes more and more a reality, the heavy demands upon transportation equipment, terminals and port facilities may very well render existing conditions in some wholesale markets unsatisfactory” (Engle* 1941: 433). Generally, the feeling was that change would be limited base on evidence from World War I. The changes that had taken place then were seen as part of the on-going industrial revolution among manufacturers and the growing importance of marketing. While there was concern about government programs price control and rationing, they were not seen as having major impact on the structure of retailing and wholesaling.

Once the war time economy took hold concerns were offered. Nystrom described four possibilities in retailing. Retail sales would decline as a result of the shortage of goods; retail store expansion and modernization will be curtailed if not brought to a standstill as a result of the reallocation of construction materials. Retailers might be helpful in the elimination of waste though inventory management practices especially when cooperating with manufacturers in the simplification of goods. Finally, retailers will play an important role in the supporting public morale through advertising and promotional activities as they did during World War II (Nystrom* 1942). Beckman warns of attacks “threatening the long-held, time honored position of the wholesaler” (Beckman* 1942: 9). He saw defense procurement programs harming small business firms which do not have the scale to respond to large orders. “The wholesaler's existence is intimately tied up with the survival of small business enterprises, both on the manufacturing end and on the retailing phase of our economic system” (Beckman* 1942: 10).

In spite of concerns of significant structural changes, there was little evidence to support them although there were changes in marketing practices. Thompson noted department store inventories were reduced as the result of fewer goods, but this had created an understanding of the value of balanced inventories. Sales activities were affected because many knowledgeable staff either sought employment in hire paying positions or went off to war (Thompson* 1943). In food distribution, no new institutional forms appeared as a result of the war. World War I gave rise to the chains and supermarkets but “No similar change is coming about during this war, if anything, the old and tried

systems have strengthened their positions” although the war has led to many store closings as a result of changes in labor force preferences (Dipman* 1944: 321). In department stores evidence indicated increasing pressure on margins but “On the whole, the effect upon retailing of economic programs has not been destructive—because the administration of regulation in most districts has been of the 'common sense' variety” (Iglauer* 1944: 326). In a 1944 study of food retailing, similar conclusions were reached. While there had been a decline in retail food outlets, especially smaller ones, based on a shortage of goods, the rate of decline was consistent with the trend that began in the 1930s, characterized by fewer smaller stores, more larger stores, and more chain stores so that “the current increasing food mortality is resulting from a narrowing of food outlets” (Patzig* 1944: 113). In a review of shopping centers, a study indicated that the number of stores in some centers was decreasing at the same time there was a shift from older centers to newer centers (Green* 1946).

Postwar Planning

Postwar Planning is mentioned in almost all of the articles. The theme was that the post war economy would differ from the both the pre-war and war time economy, however, there was no agreement as to what it might look like nor marketing's role. One author wrote “following this war we will find ourselves on the edge of a new world...we are coming into a very short period of time developments and improvements that would normally come about in twenty or twenty five years” (Hoffman* 1943: 39). There was agreement about the need to convert “As the principal war problem was production the principal postwar problem will be distribution” (Adam 1945*: 350). Distribution was viewed as critical for the recovery. “When the war is over, our ability to produce will be unquestioned. At that time our ability to distribute will get a severe test” (Anderson 1942*: 115). Forecasts were for basic changes such as the “concentration of economic power” as a result of the war (Lebar* 1944: 12). If true, this would create complexity in assessing competition, competitors, and markets; firms had to be prepared to handle these, unpredictable as they might be. First, there was the possibility of long run rampant inflation as the result of pent-up demand and by “ample funds out of which the purchases might be made and a scarcity of goods” (Phillips* 1944: 289). Second, the manufacturing sector may not be able to produce consumer goods in sufficient volume as they readjust their production facilities. “This reconversion from a war to peace production is in large part a marketing problem” (Livingston* 1943: 335). The “ability to distribute will be the most severe test” (Alderson* 1942: 115). “At the end of World War II, there will be still greater production capacity [compared to World War I] and the same antiquated marketing and distribution system to handle the output unless something is done” (Hoffman* 1944: 9). Third, a key challenge was “finding domestic markets to absorb our production and keeping our workers employed at their proven capacity and ability to produce” (Johnson* 126). Interestingly, there is no mention of developing and expanding foreign markets!

Throughout is the call for more and better market research to meet the post war needs. The emphasis was on moving from “market research” to marketing research but not in the context of consumer behavior as currently defined. Weld called for a foundation of market research to “build up a greater appreciation of its value among manufacturers and marketers” as well as an improvement in research methods (Weld 1940*: 68). This was based on regarding marketing as active function rather than a passive one. It should be seen “as a gigantic dynamo whose role is to generate demand” (Lebhar* 1944: 312). Also was the challenge to “change from a buyer's to a seller's market in a large number of consumer items,” returning to the concept of the pre war by assessing the changes, demographic, family size, income distribution, and location of consumers (Watson* 1944: 231). The premise was “the individual corporation must continue to realize that markets are people. Whether it sells directly to people or indirectly through later-stage processors and distributors, it cannot afford to neglect to study the trends in population, purchasing power, and buying habits especially as they relate to post-war activities” (Cowan* 1942: 54-55). Four research areas were identified: One, the selection of new products or the revision of old products; two, the determination of new markets for products; three, the development of the most efficient methods of distribution; and, four, the determination of “new sales territories and to correlate sales promotion and advertising efforts” (Hirose*1945: 342). A brief article suggests the need to consider diverse market segments in this case “the Negro market” (Sullivan 1945).

There were a series of proposals for the application of marketing in post war on a scale that would include business, government and local communities with macro rather than micro dimensions. A “marketing viewpoint...in governmental planning” was called for (Alderson* 1943: 332). One proposal focused on developing of neighborhood marketing systems including community

organizations and the “retailers who knows his customer, the wholesaler who serves the retailer and the manufacturer who produces the merchandise” (Hovde* 1943: 339) Another extended marketing planning to the national level keeping an eye out for “maintaining a high level of production and employment” in the economy; creating aggregate demand was an important task for marketing (Rush* 1943: 154). These discussions were wide ranging and argued for integrated efforts among a wide number of participants. How much of this came to fruition is unknown and an interesting area for investigation.

Much attention was given to how to eliminate price control and rationing policies. Although the broader discussion of public policy is found in the following section, planning for its demise is presented here. That began simultaneously with its introduction. In 1941 Grether wrote “Nothing during 1941 so far as price polices are concerned equaled in significance actual and potential wartime price controls” (Grether* 1941: 16). As they went into effect and ran their course during the war, the major question became “what will happen at the end of the war?” There were no answers; nothing of their magnitude had ever been contemplated let alone experienced in America. On the one hand, there was “the potential the postwar economy at least for an interval would be recognizable similar to that prior to the war” with little need to keep price control and rationing (Grether* 1944: 296). On the other hand, “price regulation intended to protect competitors from injurious, or in general unfair price competition” might be necessary (Grether* 1944: 30). The alternatives transcended the price regulations matters that had begun before the war, namely, the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 and the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937. Overarching was planning for the potential inflationary conditions including the “inflationary state of mind,” certainly macroeconomic couched in marketing terms. How quickly the policies are changed or removed “will be even more important after World War II than it was in 1918—because of the greater amount of direct regulation which this war has made necessary” and “with the war over, we may expect a violent reaction to such controls, with the resulting danger that some of them may be lifted at the time when they are most needed” Phillips* 1944: 291). While no plans were offered whatever might happen, the government must demonstrate to the public “the need for, but its ability to handle successfully, price control in the immediate postwar period” (Phillips* 1944: 292).

Price control and rationing

These articles represent 22% of the set' they are given special attention because they reflect heretofore unknown public policy matters facing marketing. Also, they provide insights about handling marketing issues and the need development of marketing concepts. No effort was spared in discussing regulations, their administrative procedures, the possible impact on business, and methods of evaluation. The basic underlying goals of public regulations were to ensure resources were made available to support the war, to ensure fair prices and profits for business, and to protect American consumers from inflation and unfair practices. Understanding how regulations would translate into policies for business was a daunting task. The analyses are not totally about the application of public policy per se but how public policy would have been better if it had been linked to evolving marketing analysis. Full understanding of this transition requires an examination of the economic analyses that were taking place at the same, however, that is beyond the present study but there are key articles that the interested reader will find of value (Rostow 1942; Galbraith 1943, 1946; Miller 1943; Wilcox 1945). Little is said about how individual firms managed price control and rationing policies, an interesting area with volumes of materials worthy of study. What is missing in both the economic and marketing analyses are detailed examples of how firms actually were engaged in price control and rationing. A brief review of retailer archives suggests that such materials are available and waiting for case analysis.

Price control

There had been little preparation for price control in the prewar period nor any understanding of how to implement or evaluate programs either at the national or firm level. The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission and the Defense Commission's Consumer Division, a precursor to the Office of Price Administration, issued appeals to businesses and consumers to inhibit price increases as a means of diminishing unrest that the war might produce. These “regular procedures, voluntary trade action and informed public were considered adequate remedies” (Grether* 141: 223). This changed dramatically once the United States entered the war and the introduction of price control and rationing. “Once the price control bill is [was] enacted a much wider array of producers' goods and also

consumers' goods will come [came] under control" (Grether* 1942: 16). Insights were drawn from the European and Canadian experiences. Price control in Europe was achieved through retail price maintenance programs; these were viewed as dangerous for the United States because they "cannot fail to destroy the fundamentals of our distribution system" (Wolff* 1940: 147). Canadian price control was implemented in 1939; however, it was shaped by structural conditions not found in America. Its economy was integrated with Great Britain's. Canada's challenge was to control prices because of the vast proportion that imports played in the economy. Both price control and rationing were implemented in petroleum markets where it was necessary to ensure supplies for the transport of goods. Among the practices employed were strict rationing of consumer supplies, limitations on the construction of new gasoline stations, and direct regulations of Sunday sales, and restricted hours of operation between 7 a. m. and 7 p. m. (Derber* 1943).

Analysis of food prices took center stage with attempts to understand what might be learned from a comparison of the run-up to the 1940s with the period prior to World War I. Working noted "During World War I, we felt food shortages primarily at three points: first, in sugar; second in wheat; and finally in meat, conditions which were not present in 1941 and 1942 (Working* 1942: 30). He believed that controls should only be put in place when increased demand or reduced supply results in periods of "serious scarcity," but we should avoid, so far as possible, the type of price control which involves the fixing of retail prices, and the attendant effect and annoyance of various forms of direct consumer rationing" (Working* 1942: 36). As with others, he argued for reliance on fiscal and monetary policies and agricultural adjustment programs, especially those aimed at managing surpluses. Yet, price control and rationing developed in great measure because of the weaknesses of fiscal and monetary policies to protect consumers from inflation.

Seven articles trace the development of price controls, their management, and their effects on business and consumers. They begin with the caveat "It is so much simpler (and safer) to investigate the remains instead of the living organism—particularly when the organism has not achieved the stability of full maturity but is violently engaged in its survival adaptations to the environment" (Grether* 1943: 300). Based on early evidence results of the Emergency Price Control Act and the Office of Price Administration in December 1942, there appeared to be reasonable progress in defining and establishing price control programs. As of late March 1943 in a final review of his manuscript new he amended the earlier opinion. "The more recent reports are less favorable since vigor and straight forwardness appear to be giving ground to vacillation" (Grether* 1943: 318). The administration of price control was creating uneasiness among the business community. Grether wrote about the limited realism and complexity in the program, more than would have been the case if the focus had relied on marketing concepts rather than microeconomic theory. Price control in war time arises out of the inability of the price system to meet war demands. "Under these circumstances, would it not preferable to strive for simplicity rather than pursue the spurious effort of making equitable decisions, individual adjustments which cannot usually be made adequately?" (Grether* 1943:308). Based on the idea that war is a conflict between industrial systems, his argument is that price controls should have recognized marketing realities, an argument that runs more than 5 double column journal pages. In a subsequent 3 pages, he introduces how price controls should have focused on marketing channels. "Unfortunately, for the price fixers, economic analysis had paid little attention to the vertical market and price relations in the production—processing--distribution channels. Thus, for better or worse much of what was done here had to be done without the benefit of prior academic analysis" (Grether* 1943: 311, emphasis added). Many of these ideas were incorporated in the development of a new view of marketing with Reavis Cox and R. S. Vaile in Marketing in the American Economy (Vaile, Grether, and Cox 1952).

In January 1943, 3 full length articles and a shorter integrative comment on price control were published in the *JM* (Hirsch* 1944; Phillips* 1944; Grether 1944*; Burley* 1944). Hirsch reviewed price control in Europe where the "trends and consequences [are] quite different from those influencing the American war economy, which even more than before has proved to be an economy of abundance" (Hirsch* 1944: 282). He believed the post war would be characterized by deflation, not inflation and "we shall need the best marketing technique to deal with the problems" (Hirsch* 1944: 284). Evaluation of market conditions led him to recommend maintaining price controls as war time levels and use excess profit taxes as a means of controlling inflation. Phillips agreed in part with the prospects for deflation although inflation remains an ever possible event well past the end of the war for which he recommends "On grounds of self interest alone, marketing men should be united in an effort to stop inflation both during the war and in the immediate postwar period" (Phillips* 1944: 293, emphasis added). Burley commented on the papers much as conference discussant might.

Speculating about the post war, Grether argued for a marketing perspective rather than an economic one in understanding how firms behave under competition and monopoly. "Marketing practitioners and teachers know that both points of view are badly out of focus although there is some validity in both" (Grether 1944*: 297). Importantly he widens the analysis by discussing both private and public control issues. Prices will be regulated in marketing channels "in entirely or in part by the producers and owners of branded goods," a form of private rather than governmental regulation in which he noted how fair trade pricing and price discrimination legislation as well as the Sherman Antitrust Act had to be considered (Grether 1944: 297). The hope is for a "shift from wartime government controls in order to hold prices down to a combination of private and governmental control to restrain aggressive price cutting" which will "find expression through prewar expansion of price regulation intended to protect competitors from injuries or in general unfair price competition" (Grether* 1944: 301). The articles reflected their understanding based on their participation in war time programs and except for Phillips, the arguments do not use references. They are not speculative essays rather they are reasoned discussions of consequences based on circumstances and events which they believe to valid.

Rationing

The discussion of rationing centered on operational rather than philosophical elements as with the case with price control. Grether acknowledges the great difficulties of developing rationing programs and is critical of the government's slowness in developing a program especially in light of the British experience which could have provide direction for American rationing (Grether* 1943). Derber compares gasoline rationing in Canada and the United States. Similarities are present, but the differences abound because of the fundamental purposes and methods of program administration. "In Canada gasoline has been rationed principally to conserve gasoline and thereby protect necessary transportation" in contrast to the United States where "gasoline has been rationed principally (except on the East Coast)...to save rubber" then noting that that "the program has been been accepted more readily in Canada" (Derber* 1943: 137). He focuses on program on how the program operated and the openness to revisions to relate to conditions not originally considered; these included the needs of industrial workers to have greater access to gasoline and providing local authorities the ability to readjust policies. Overall rationing for this commodity "has worked though concern is expressed about the years ahead" (Derber* 1943: 144).

Alexander's "wartime adventures" are a series of reports published between 1945 and 1947. In great detail he examined how programs devolved from policy (Alexander* 1945a, 1945b, 1946; Alexander 1947). The adventures were "a series of three articles on wartime uses of measures short of [formal] rationing in an attempt to secure equitable distribution" (Alexander* 1945b; 135 from the Editor's Note). Rationing was under the jurisdiction of the War Production Board carried out by voluntarily by manufacturers and wholesalers. The major concern was whether the voluntary rationing programs met the criterion of "equitable distribution," not equal distribution. Alexander, a major participant in rationing programs reported on results although he did not acknowledge whether the views were his or the agency's. His general conclusion was that "the voluntary allotment systems of suppliers have failed to bring about the equitable distribution of merchandise. They have brought about a fairer distribution and one more corresponding to need than would have existed had they not been employed," leaving holes in the distribution system which have required other remedies (Alexander* 1945a: 13). There was a "maldistribution" of consumer goods in which suppliers failed to make appropriate allocations of merchandise to communities and their retailers as a result of dramatic changes to their economic conditions. The War Production Board did revise some programs and institute new programs for some consumer goods based on successful practices in the textile industry. These were based on strict allocations were made for various types of clothing but within each category consumers could allocate ration coupons more freely. He noted that one of his colleagues was not pleased with the process or the results. "One of the more purely Bourbon 'economic royalists on the staff of the Board remembered that the measure was 'worse than anything that had been done in Russia in that it reaches right down into the home and controls what the citizen can buy" (Alexander* 1946: 168). The report also describes the "fire-chasing" methods for handling shortages which were developed on a case-by-case basis using a complex rating system for consumers and their needs whose such "attempts to achieve such distribution constitutes an interesting study in the intricacies of bureaucratic political maneuver" (Alexander* 1946*: 173).

Labeling

Caught up in although not central to price control and rationing were proposals for the labeling of consumer goods. They were offered as a means of simplifying consumer choice by providing measures of quality. A mandatory A B C grade labeling was offered as means of helping consumers make better choices and fostering competition among sellers (Hotchkiss* 1945). There were diverse views about their value. Some thought they would be anti-competitive while others it saw it as a way of providing more and better information (Bader and Hotchkiss* 1942). Nothing was done about the labeling proposals; they were seen as overly complex more so than other war time policies (Coles and Erdman 1945*). "No system can be devised that will relieve consumers of the necessity of trusting some human agency. In their search for their money's worth, they now have a wide option" including their own efforts and the actions of competitors (Hotchkiss 1945*: 134). Although an inconsequential element in the public policy discussions of the period, their inclusions in the journal reflect the marketing's fascination with public policy.

Retrospect and prospect

This study summarizes the content of a sample of the marketing literature produced during World War II; evidence shows what the editors of the *Journal Marketing* thought important about World War II, the most dramatic event since the journal's founding on January 1, 1938 (Applebaum 1947*). The articles in this period exhibit marketing's heritage in economic theory and its development in its own right as it moved away from economics. One area for extending the present work would be a collective biography of editorial board of the *JM* the editors during the period R. S. Vaile, 1937-1941, R. Cox, 1941-1945, E. T. Grether, 1939-1943, C. F. Phillips, 1943-1947, and C. W. Phelps, 1945-1949 (Grether 1976; Applebaum 1947; 1952). Understanding who they were what affected they way they thought about these matters would provide additional dimensions. The research should be extended by a study of the professional affiliation of the authors, a perspective advocated by Applebaum (1952a; 1952b). Individual biographies can also serve to provide a more robust understanding of the people and the period and as a result of this work I have begun a biography of E. T. Grether (Savitt 2011).

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Appendix 1
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