Stephen Harper, Michael Ignatieff, and Canada’s Politics of Identity

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Abstract This article examines the visions of Stephen Harper and Michael Ignatieff. Using two identity models allows for an examination of contemporary Canadian politics and its future. Despite considerable differences in principles and goals and the political competition between the leaders of the Conservative and Liberal Parties, Canada’s well-established two-party dynamic continues as it did prior to these leaders arriving on the political scene.

Canada’s Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper secured re-election and a second consecutive minority government in October 2008 with an enhanced share of popular votes and parliamentary seats, leaving him just twelve MPs short of the 155 needed for a majority. Harper’s first minority had lasted a record-setting thirty-one months. An economist from Calgary, Alberta, Harper holds conservative views on Canada’s identity by honoring individual responsibility, limited government and decentralized federalism. Michael Ignatieff, the opposition Liberal party leader and Harper’s possible successor, perceives Canada’s identity very differently. Ignatieff has embraced a civic nationalist rights discourse arising from Canada’s cultural diversities. We survey the identity politics context in which they operate. What are the Harper and Ignatieff visions of Canada and its future? What are the long-term implications of Harper’s government? We argue that a majority-seeking Harper aspires to wrest Canadian nationalism and identity politics from the left and reclaim them as conservative causes like they are elsewhere. He wishes to change the perception that his party is “the only conservative party of the world that isn’t the party of patriotism.”¹ We have less information on Ignatieff. But he clearly wishes Canadians to permit civic nationalism to define their identity, and even to secure Canada’s survival.

To help us address these questions, we describe and analyze the two identity models we associate with Harper and Ignatieff: Canada as a decentralized federation of relatively autonomous individuals and provinces which operates in world affairs as a faithful ally of the United States (Harper’s position); and Canada as a diverse multicultural society defined by mutual respect for rights (Ignatieff’s position). However, we acknowledge that observers of Canada’s politics have identified a policy consensus on national identity markers such as bilingualism and multiculturalism, open immigration, interregional wealth redistribution, tax-funded universal health care, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which has imposed a narrow range of political debate on federal politics.² Before Harper took over Canada’s Conservative party, John Ibbitson detected a political culture which makes successful politicians
prove their visible commitment to moderation, pragmatism, and the ideological middle-road, especially in populous southern Ontario.\(^3\) For Richard Gwyn, Canada effectively operated as a “one-party state dependent on the co-existence of two identical parties—one in, one out—in a kind of Kabuki ritual.”\(^4\) More specifically, and more recently under Harper’s government, Jeffrey Simpson has identified four of Canada’s most pressing political issues as “no-fly zones” which leaders of major parties tacitly agreed not to discuss before and since Harper assumed power: Quebec’s status and role in Canada, the Aboriginal reserve system, how immigration “is doing more to change and challenge Canada than any other development”, and how Alberta “is becoming so much richer than the rest that it will strain all sorts of federal policies.”\(^5\) Simpson has since added Afghanistan policy to his list of taboos, in contrast to the vigorous debates in Britain and the United States on the subject.\(^6\) We suggest that Canada’s well established two-party dynamic is operating much as before under Harper and Ignatieff, despite their dissimilar principles.

The Harper Model: Canada as a Decentralized Federation and Faithful Ally

Harper has accelerated the ongoing trend towards increased provincial power with his “open federalism” policy. Besides Harper, this model has supporters in Paul Romney and in Mike Harris and Preston Manning. Romney, a historian, argues that Canada’s 1867 Confederation was a deal between autonomy-minded Quebecers and equally autonomist Ontario Reformers which founded a federal-provincial “coordinate sovereignty.” For example, Reform leader George Brown’s *Globe* newspaper endorsed giving the new Dominion’s provinces ample powers and full control over them.\(^7\) Confederation represented the marriage of distinct but complementary Upper and Lower Canada compact theories.\(^8\) Romney denounces certain English Canadian historians, notably Donald Creighton, for their “biased history” exaggerating John A. Macdonald’s importance and his well-known preference for a centralized state.\(^9\) According to Romney, this inaccurate and damaging interpretation has emboldened successive federal governments to violate provincial autonomy and precipitate threats to national survival like Quebec’s sovereignty movement. English Canadian nationalism and centralist historians have impeded English Canadians’ appreciation of coordinate sovereignty’s historical basis. But coordinate sovereignty still prevails amongst Quebecers.\(^10\) For Romney, there can be no national unity until all Canadians respect the same history—in this case, coordinate sovereignty. Romney quotes Bishop Desmond Tutu that “if you don’t have some accepted history the chances are you will not gel as a community.”\(^11\)

Beyond question, Romney is correct about Quebecers’ firmly entrenched view of Confederation. Quebec’s pro-Confederation leaders of the time proclaimed that the provinces “will be sovereign in all matters which are specifically assigned to them,” as Joseph Cauchon put it.\(^12\) George-Etienne Cartier, Quebec’s “father of autonomy”\(^13\), assured Quebecers that their “particular rights and interests should be properly guarded and protected.”\(^14\) The 1956 “Tremblay” Quebec Royal Commission Report declared flatly that Canada’s 1867 constitution “made the Province of Quebec…the French-Canadian centre par excellence, and the accredited guardian for French-Canadian civilization.”\(^15\) Quebec’s subsequent “Quiet Revolution” built upon this foundation with demands for freedom from federal interference. English Canadian historians’ familiar argument that Cartier and his fellow bleus willingly founded a “highly centralized state” despite their rhetoric still enjoys currency elsewhere, but not in Quebec.\(^16\)

Harris and Manning, in their “Canada Strong and Free” project with Vancouver’s free-market Fraser Institute,
implicitly apply Romney’s history lesson to the federal-provincial relationship. They appeal for a “rebalanced federalism” of equal provinces and equal Canadians. Under rebalanced federalism, Ottawa will stop its intrusions into provincial jurisdictions so resented in Quebec and the West. This will relieve the “dis-unifying tensions that afflict Canada” which federal energy policies and social programs in provincial fields like health, welfare, and education have aggravated. These reforms will unleash the free market, enhance every Canadian’s quality of life, and strengthen national unity by reducing federal taxes, regulation, and spending, all of which have grown much faster in Canada than in the United States since the late 1960s.

In their conservative manifesto, Tasha Kheiriddin and Adam Daifallah similarly propose that the federal government promote personal responsibility, self-reliance, and freedom in a more competitive, entrepreneurial, and achievement-oriented society. Harris and Manning insist that their decentralized Canada can maintain unity. A rebalanced federation can identify and pursue common interests through inter-provincial “memorandums of understanding.” These “flexible bonds woven among the provinces” can ensure each province’s commitment to national objectives without Ottawa’s interference.

In foreign policy, Harris and Manning assert that the economic prosperity needed for national identity and unity requires a high level of cooperation and even integration between Canada and the United States. Even such sensitive matters as refugee acceptance policies and domestic cultural programs should be harmonized between the two countries. Besides, Harris and Manning imply that these countries’ national values and priorities construe the world around them similarly. It is their global roles that differ. So, deeper integration need not endanger Canada’s values, which they do not identify anyway. Moreover, Canadians must be effective players in Washington to advance their security and prosperity. Historian J. L. Granatstein agrees. Deploring Canada’s failure to support the Iraq invasion, Granatstein argues that public disagreement with the United States “hurts us immeasurably with Congress, the administration, and the American media.” Because “Canada simply cannot afford to alienate its largest customer, best friend, and ultimate defender”, Canadians must end their hostility to the United States and “get on with that country”—especially given the growing ill will towards Canada which Granatstein detects in the American political class and media.

Harper, who was once Manning’s protégé in the Reform party, evidently accepts the preceding four paragraphs’ arguments. Under Harper’s open federalism, Ottawa leaves provincial responsibilities alone. Moreover, our holder of two University of Calgary degrees in Economics endorses the philosophy of Austrian Friedrich Hayek. Hayek rejected government intervention in the economy for threatening personal freedom, but also because it interferes with the “spontaneous order” which prevails when people are left free to make their own choices in the marketplace and take the consequences of those decisions. Because economies are self-correcting when left alone, and because state intrusion into economic decisions represents “the road to serfdom”, Hayek explicitly repudiated Keynesian economics. Harper admires the neo-liberal policies of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. He regrets that Canada’s leaders of their day, notably Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, failed to follow their tax- and regulation-cutting example. Some label Harper a Reagan-modelled supply-sider preoccupied with reducing taxes and the role of government, even at the expense of growing deficits.

But Harper surely appreciates that Mulroney’s record, which Kheiriddin and Daifallah criticize for lacking fiscal restraint, raising taxes, and more than doubling the
national debt, suggests that Canada’s conservative heritage has handed a free-marketeer something of a poisoned chalice. Indeed, Kheiriddin and Daifallah denounce John A. Macdonald, the father of Canadian conservatism, as a non-ideological centralist, a supporter of government spending, and a drunk besides. Macdonald’s successors as Conservative Prime Ministers, including John Diefenbaker and Joe Clark, fare scarcely better, at least in their (non-)ideology and spending policies. All in all, Canada’s conservatism affords Harper little collective memory and few identity markers to exploit when seeking public support.

For Robin Sears, Harper’s Canada differs strikingly from the “caring and sharing society of peacekeepers” asserted by many Liberals since the Lester Pearson-Pierre Trudeau era. Harper’s policy agenda, a “heterodox blend of conservatism, populism, and nationalism”, features proud membership in the “Anglosphere” and a status as loyal ally of the United States, whenever possible also serving alongside Australia and the United Kingdom; a strong and respected military willing and able to use force to defend Canada’s national and security interests (not to serve as non-combatant peacekeepers); a decentralized federation where Ottawa does not impose federal programs on Canada’s provinces or municipalities; and a diverse, multicultural society— but one with common goals, values, and institutions rather than a cultural mosaic that celebrates differences.

Harper has proceeded cautiously for the most part. He respects his precarious minority position. He also accepts the advice of his University of Calgary mentor Tom Flanagan, who observes that Canada is not yet a conservative country. Flanagan counsels that winning a majority requires incrementalism and “moving towards the position of the median voter.” In his 1996 “Winds of Change” speech to a conservative conference at Calgary, Harper suggested that conservatives can take and hold power in Ottawa only when they simultaneously appeal to Flanagan’s “three sisters”: Western populists then in the Reform party, traditional Progressive Conservatives primarily in Ontario and Atlantic Canada, and Quebec’s “soft” nationalists then supporting the Bloc Quebecois. Like Harris and Manning, Harper believes that Ottawa can relieve alienation in Quebec and the West by largely withdrawing from Canadians’ lives. In his Calgary address, Harper proposed that Quebeckers outside Montreal resemble Westerners. He explained Quebec sovereignty’s appeal to “voters who would not be out of place in Red Deer, except that they speak French rather than English. They are nationalist for the same reason that Albertans are populist—they care about their local identity and the culture that nourishes it, and they see the federal government as a threat to their way of life.” Thomas Walkom calls Harper a radical “in the true sense of the word” for wishing to make changes which cut to the root of Canada’s politics. For example, Harper is a moralistic social conservative determined to assign all social services, from health care to child care, to the provinces to operate as they choose with no federal interference.

On foreign policy, Harper was “unequivocal” in his support for the Iraq invasion, which he deemed a test of Canada’s resolve, reliability as an ally, and capacity to meet its responsibilities which Canada failed disgracefully. Iraq showed Harper that liberals are defeatist on terrorism for their moral relativism and moral neutrality, and for rejecting “any tradition or convention of morality” in the face of oppressive governments’ threats to western values and human rights. But Harper has said little about Iraq since taking office. In 2006, he “enthusiastically embraced” the NATO mission in Afghanistan and rhetorically aligned Canada with President George W. Bush and Prime Ministers Tony Blair and John Howard in NATO-led operations enforcing (in his words) a “fundamental vision of civilization and
human values” worldwide. Harper has assured Australia’s Parliament that Canada stands proudly with the United States, Britain, and Australia in their “noble and necessary” defense of democracy over tyranny. For Harper, to whom Lawrence Martin assigns an us-versus-them “clash of civilizations template,” Canadians’ identity and patriotism lie in respecting their regional diversities, but especially in honoring moral imperatives which bind them to their Anglospheric principles and to the global responsibilities these principles impose.

To a large extent, Harper, who pledges to “stand up for Canada”, is grounding his view of patriotism and identity in Canada’s military. Support for the Canadian Forces, who have suffered over 130 fatalities to date in NATO’s Afghanistan mission, is “something emotional” for Harper. For some, Canada enjoys a proud military history as “never one to back away from war.” Canadians seem to like Harper’s muscular foreign policy. Pollster Frank Graves finds that the military has supplanted medicare and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation as “the most recognizable face of the federal government.” Lawrence Martin laments that 9/11 has shifted the political spectrum rightward, affecting Liberals and Conservatives alike. Canadians seem not to mind that Harper has effectively redefined Canadian patriotism by replacing their traditional voice of moderation in global affairs through diplomacy and peacekeeping with a “glorification of the armed services.”

The Ignatieff Model: Canada as a Multicultural Mosaic

Our second identity model has been addressed by philosophers Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor, and by Andrew Cohen and John Ibbitson as well as by Ignatieff. For all of them, Canada is defined largely by the presence of disparate groups. Kymlicka’s Canada is a federation of groups, some based on nationality (Quebecers, Aboriginals, and English Canadians) and some on territory (provinces and regions). Each group respects the others’ right to keep their distinct cultures viable. But only the three “nationality-based” groups, including English Canadians as a language community with shared interests, have “adopted a nationalist project.” They alone deserve self-rule, semi-detached from Ottawa, inside a redesigned asymmetric multinational federation. Historically disadvantaged groups like women, gays, and ethnic minorities merit guaranteed representation in Parliament, possibly through fixed quotas of seats.

Taylor, unlike Kymlicka, proposes to extend equal recognition and status to all of Canada’s “deep diversities.” These include Kymlicka’s identity groups like women and gays. Quebecers also need formal recognition of their distinctiveness. But English Canadians maintain regional identities. They will accept Quebecers’ recognition only if they and their regions secure a similar status. Whatever Canadians do, they must avert a sense of relative deprivation, or the “real heat…generated from the perception of recognition denied, the sense that one group counts for nothing or too little.”

Before entering politics, Ignatieff was a noted public intellectual with a Harvard doctorate in History and numerous books on nationalism, ethnicity, and rights. For him, Canada is “simply a patchwork quilt of distinctive societies” (English Canadians, Quebecers, Aboriginals, and
immigrants) which “do not inhabit the same historical reality.” Their founding mythologies are incompatible and will remain so. History will never be the same for Quebecers and English Canadians, who cannot agree on what the Plains of Abraham battle means. Quebecers will continue to cherish their victimology with its “old memories of hurts and slights.” Besides, for Quebecers “English Canada as a whole has become less and less relevant”, while Quebec “has ceased to define itself in terms of Canada.” So does Ignatieff consider Quebecers as victims of destructive ethnic nationalism, which (as he concludes from the Balkan wars of the 1990s) is exclusive, emotional, repressive, and subject to violence? Not at all. In contrast to the Balkan experience, Quebecers have fashioned an “officially French society” where they feel comfortable and secure. Ignatieff has overcome his earlier reservations about Quebec’s ethnic nationalism. He became convinced that, thanks to their newly achieved linguistic and cultural security, Quebecers have attained an admirable and inclusive civic nation, victimology and all, whose rights culture benefits all Quebecers, regardless of ethnicity or language. Ignatieff also evidently agrees with Kymlicka that honoring Quebec’s French character advances national unity by facilitating Quebecers’ acceptance of, and integration into, Canadian society.

But how can multicultural Canada survive with no common language, consensus on history, or sole identity for its immigrants to integrate into? Immigrants demanding inclusion cannot accept the concept of Canada basically as a pact between founding races. Such a definition of Canada “seems to accord no place to them.” For Ignatieff, who names Isaiah Berlin and Pierre Trudeau (and Trudeau’s Charter of Rights) as his inspirations, only “rights delivery…will hold us together.” Canada must integrate into western liberal values a rapidly growing immigrant population speaking more than seventy languages in Toronto alone. Immigrants need a civic nationalist (not ethnically grounded) rights-based community where Canadians accept and respect each other, in all their diversities, as rights-bearing equals. Ignatieff’s civic nationalism aspires to create a wholly inclusive society in which no one is refused equality or participation in public governance or in the institutions of civil society. In his Canada, individuals may define their own identity and political engagement for themselves, rather than having them imposed. So the liberal state’s objective is to provide citizens with the space and the ability to live their lives as they see fit. Ignatieff speculates that civic nationalism amid ethnic diversity has the potential to make Canada the civic society par excellence, a worldwide exemplar of tolerance in an era riven by ethnic conflict. But he does not contend that Canada already has attained his civic nationalist ideal.

Canada’s civic nationalism somehow must also accommodate Quebecers and Aboriginals as “constituent groups” with enduring ethnicity-based loyalties. Indeed, these and other “collective identities and longings are primary and passionate and…there’s no point in arguing about them.” As Liberal party leader Ignatieff is currently encouraging Quebec nationalists to connect with Canada and, not incidentally, with a party which many Quebecers unhelpfully associate with Trudeau’s rejection of group rights. Ignatieff is now reassuring Quebecers that his views have evolved, distancing him from Trudeau. He now comfortably accepts their communal rights and by extension Quebec’s effective autonomy. He further recognizes that Quebecers’ primary allegiance will remain with Quebec. He does not reveal whether he could accept Harper-like decentralization or if he fears Taylor’s “real heat” from non-Quebecers’ perceived relative deprivation. But Nurse insists that Ignatieff, like most Liberals, supports a “big state” capable of putting in place and enforcing the physical, legal, and
constitutional infrastructure of a liberal order.\textsuperscript{73}

Ignatieff acknowledges some contradictions and complications in his approach. He concedes that politics under civic nationalism is fragile, unruly, contentious, and features “semi-permanent political crisis.”\textsuperscript{74} He realizes that civic nationalism lacks ethnic nationalism’s emotional allure. Ignatieff appreciates that ethnic identities, but not civic nationalism, can fulfill the need for belonging. But as civic values are indispensable for freedom, they must take precedence.\textsuperscript{75} Nurse finds that Ignatieff harbors “passionate concern, and worry” about civic nationalism’s prospects for success in Canada.\textsuperscript{76} In Nurse’s view, neither Ignatieff nor anyone else can reconcile Quebec and Aboriginal identity models with an individual-based civic nationalist society. Moreover, Ignatieff cannot explain why we should expect Canada’s rapidly growing ethnic minorities, primarily from group-oriented Asian cultures, to choose his individual-empowering civic nationalism over their more emotionally compelling communal solidarity.\textsuperscript{77}

Cohen doubts that Canada’s multicultural society can integrate immigrants in accordance with Ignatieff’s formula. He defies a taboo which Ignatieff ignores. He attacks multiculturalism’s operation if not its principle for turning Canada into “an ethnic archipelago with nothing in common.” Canada does not even offer its immigrants Ignatieff’s inadequate civic nationalist model. It furnishes them only an “empty vessel” lacking the integrating political culture which any “united self-assured nation” needs.\textsuperscript{78} In this setting, mass immigration and Harper-style power decentralization hold disintegrative potential, particularly in combination.\textsuperscript{79} Like Bishop Tutu, Cohen proposes socializing immigrants into a single interpretation of Canada’s history, even as he effectively agrees with Ignatieff by calling Canada’s history a “minefield, a clash of interpretations.”\textsuperscript{80} Yet Ibbitson maintains that Canada has made itself into the world’s most successful country by “profiting from the explosive creative forces that are unleashed when people of different races, cultures, and lifestyles live together and bond.”\textsuperscript{81} Ibbitson displays more confidence in this bonding than all others cited in this section, Ignatieff prominently included. For Ibbitson, only the cultural dynamism from 250,000 immigrants each year can rescue Canada from its deep regional divisions and advance the causes of national unity and identity.\textsuperscript{82}

**Conclusion**

In a sense, Stephen Harper and Michael Ignatieff are rights-professing idealists who agree that “the world needs more Canada.” Both are moralistic internationalists who champion individualistic Anglo-Saxon values. Both believe that Canada can and should serve as an exemplar deserving emulation. In Harper’s case this means that Canadians must robustly defend their Anglospheric convictions and participate in wars to do so. For Ignatieff, Canada must serve as a beacon of human rights which shows the world how to accommodate disparate peoples in a single state. Further, both see Canada as home to diversities they must safeguard. Harper affirms respect for the autonomy of Canada’s varied individuals, regions, and provinces; Ignatieff affirms respect for the rights of Canada’s varied linguistic and ethnic groups. While their conservative and liberal views naturally influence their assessments of Ottawa’s role, government in general, and Canada’s global responsibilities and reputation, growing similarities between Conservatives and Liberals mitigate these differences. For one thing, Harper’s Citizenship Minister Jason Kenney, like Ignatieff, argues that multiculturalism has its limits. Canada’s immigrants have a “duty to integrate.”\textsuperscript{83} They must set aside old loyalties: “We want people to be Canadians first and foremost.”\textsuperscript{84} Also, with 9/11 having shifted Canada’s political center towards continentalism, Liberals who once opposed
But by late 2009 he had accepted his Liberal predecessors’ close engagement with China to benefit Canada’s economy.95

Walkom, Salutin, and others on the left may overestimate Harper’s capacity or his will to impose his vision of Canada’s identity, at least in his precarious minority situation. Michael Bliss concludes that, at home and abroad, Harper’s current policies “might have been drawn from the Jean Chretien-Paul Martin songbook.”96 For Simpson, the “muddling middle of the Canadian political spectrum” has “enveloped” Harper, who has “banished all the usual conservative talismans” such as deregulation and reducing the size of government. Harper has replaced conservatism with a “mighty spending machine” similar to his Conservative and Liberal predecessors, along with stimulus deficit spending to bolster Conservative fortunes at the next election.97 Flanagan disowns such policies as “survival without any sense of direction.”98 But they reflect a political culture which pulls politicians from both the left and the right towards the consensual middle.99

This phenomenon plays out in both parties. Before entering politics, Ignatieff asserted that “Democracy is rough and tumble…but…it is better than bland or managed consensus.”100 Perhaps so, but Canada’s rough and tumble politics is filling the policy debate vacuum with personal attack and “increasingly hateful political rhetoric.”101 The true radical Conservative Harper and the big state Liberal Ignatieff accept federal politics’ current consensus, which is both bland and (tacitly) managed. Ignatieff may welcome the rightward foreign policy shift. He endorses Harper’s moralistic internationalism and his domestic and foreign initiatives, which increasingly resemble Liberal policy in any case. Unlike some previous Liberal leaders, Ignatieff is proposing neither a strong, activist federal government nor an engaged and creative foreign policy.102 So while Harper and Ignatieff advance distinctive identities for

Canada-US free trade now urge more tightly integrated bilateral economic and border policies.85 Bipartisan consensus extends further to supporting asymmetric federalism featuring effective autonomy for Quebec, maintaining immigration at the current high level, and respecting all five of Simpson’s “no-fly zones” or policy debate taboos.

Foreign issues offer added convergence. Ignatieff vigorously supported the Iraq war in its early stages with the human rights justification that Saddam Hussein was a “genocidal tyrant.”86 While Ignatieff now concedes he had been “wrong, wrong, wrong” on Iraq, Gopnik labels his foreign policy views as “hawkish.”87 That may be exaggerated, but Ignatieff is closer to Harper than to his own party’s marginalized “soft power” left.88 Then there is Afghanistan. It was Liberal Prime Minister Paul Martin, Harper’s immediate predecessor, who committed Canadian forces to volatile Kandahar as part of his strategy for dealing with the post 9/11 world.89 Harper maintains a more identity-validating commitment to Afghanistan than Martin or Ignatieff. But Andrew Cooper finds Harper’s policies there and elsewhere approaching a traditional bipartisan consensus mixing liberal internationalism (Canada as the “quintessential joiner”) with functional or niche diplomacy.90 Ignatieff’s Afghan policy is similar to Harper’s.91 Ignatieff also shares Harper’s reluctance to propose major initiatives on climate change. No wonder. According to Simpson, Canadians want climate change “action”, but “not if it unduly causes them to alter their behaviour or costs them anything.”92 Opinion polls suggest that, over time, Canadians are according climate change less urgency.93 Finally, Harper’s evolved approach to China upholds Cooper’s thesis. In 2006, Harper sounded more like a social conservative than a business conservative when he refused to forge closer economic ties with China. He attacked its human rights record and declared that “I don’t think Canadians want us to sell out important Canadian values…to the almighty dollar.”94

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Canada and different aspirations for its future domestic and global roles, their policies are similar, despite their rhetoric. It might matter little, substantively, which leader of these increasingly similar parties of patriotism leads Canada in the near future.

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2 James Laxer, “More Than Politics, This is a National Crisis.” *Globe and Mail*, April 26, 2005.
8 Ibid., 283.
9 Ibid., 83-108.
10 Ibid., 277.
11 Ibid., 277-278.
14 Ajzenstat et al., 285.
18 Ibid., 118-123. Note this book’s table at 121 on trends in Canadian and United States government spending.
20 Harris and Manning, 225.
22 Ibid., 47.
23 Ibid., 63.
24 Ibid., 67.
26 Ibid., 107-108.
28 Ibid., 46-48. The expression “we are all Keynesians now” does not apply to Stephen Harper.
29 Ibid., 49.
31 Kheiriddin and Daifallah, 21.
32 Ibid., 5. This description differs somewhat from American conservatives’ hagiographic portrayals of their Founding Fathers.
33 Ibid., 12.
34 For a recent defense of the moderate, less ideological “Red” Toryism which Harper is trying to extirpate from his party, see Hugh Segal, “Balance is Part of Tory History.” *Globe and Mail*, March 11, 2009.
37 Johnson, 263-265, 431.
38 Ibid., 264. Emphasis added. Red Deer is a conservative city in central Alberta.
40 Ibid.
46 Simpson and Laghi.
49 Lawrence Martin, “It’s only been a Decade, but the Conservative Way is Redefining Us.” Globe and Mail, November 18, 2009.
56 Ibid., 195.
66 Ignatieff, The Rights Revolution, 130.
67 Ibid., 129-130.
68 Ibid., 53; Nurse, 32.
Nurse, 24.

Ignatieff is quoted in Gopnik, 31.

For a discussion of Trudeau’s efforts to define rights exclusively for the individual and not for collectivities, see Samuel V. LaSelva, “Understanding Canada’s Origins: Federalism, Multiculturalism, and the Will to Live Together.” Bickerton and Gagnon, 9-14.


Nurse, 33.

Ignatieff, The Rights Revolution, 6; Nurse, 38.

Ipperciel and Woo, 170.

Nurse, 47.

Ibid., 42-47.


Ibid., 51-92. The “minefield” reference is at 76.


Ibid., 12-14.


Rachel Cooke, “Michael Ignatieff: From the Late Show to Prime Minister in Waiting?” Guardian, September 27, 2009.

Ibid.; Gopnik, 29.

For the “soft power” perspective of the Liberal party’s left which Ignatieff appears not to share, see Lloyd Axworthy, Navigating a New World: Canada’s Global Future. Toronto: A. A. Knopf, 2003.


Andrew F. Cooper, “Redefining the Core Ingredients of Canadian Foreign Policy: Afghanistan as the Main Game.” Bickerton and Gagnon, 359.


Ibid., 30.

