Canada, The Caribbean, and Multiculturalism; Dialectical Reasoning and Common Ground

Elizabeth Trott
Ryerson University

Appropriating a philosophical theory to illuminate a cultural comparison is contentious. Universalists may use an established metaphysical principle and defend, through its application, an explanation of a particular sociological or historical chain of events. For example, the power of reason to unleash freedom through time, or the rise of skepticism, have grounded specific interpretations of historical events. The relativists and post modernists have been disparaging of such efforts, often citing the social constructionist nature of everything. Any theory that purports to shed new light from outside the time, place, culture, race, gender, or discourse of the event is dismissed. This paper is an attempt to make a case that not all explanations are locked into an inescapable "perspective," and that the concept of culture can be addressed without being intellectually offensive. Dialectical reasoning will be the explanatory theory. The exploration of the Hegelian dialectic in relation to Canada and the Caribbean is not historical in intent. The main focus of defending dialectical reasoning as an explanatory theory will be the usefulness of such reasoning in understanding and promoting multiculturalism as a social phenomenon in two very different places.

Not everyone thinks that Hegelian dialectical reasoning can be divorced from place and time. "Hegel and Haiti" by Susan Buck-Morss (2000) pursues Hegel's development of the master-slave dialectic. In the Philosophy of History, Hegel's argument about the march of reason through time being the key to unlock the grip of class domination and the subsequent promotion of freedom is accompanied by his rejection of slavery. She argues that his master slave metaphor (expounded in the Phenomenology) was inspired by the Haiti uprising (1804–1805). Here was a real example of the universal truth of man's pursuit of freedom. Yet
at the same time, she points out, Hegel condemned the whole of Africa as not yet ready for freedom and suggested that even Caribbean slavery was a preferred state to the barbarism of Africa. However, when Hegel pursued universal truths he seemed naively to be a cultural racist. The failure of his dialectical principle as historically helpful is also expounded in an article by Pantaleon Ireogbu, “Hegel’s Africa” (2000). Ireogbu argues that the lack of inclusiveness of his logic of ascension toward universal truth (which ascension excludes the African continent) is a fatal weakness. The most well-known universalist failed to provide a principle that encompassed all parts of existence. In spite of these compelling cases, a defense of dialectical reasoning as a framework for understanding conflicts shall be offered.

1. Philosophy and Culture

Consider philosophy as the various responses that have arisen out of challenges to shared intuitions and beliefs about the world. Naturally these responses have differed from place to place in the world. A recent publication, edited by William Sweet, *Philosophy, Culture, and Pluralism* (2000) contains articles on Western philosophy, Chinese philosophy, philosophy in the South Pacific, East Indian philosophy, Canadian philosophy, and the above mentioned article, “Hegel’s Africa.” Historical, geographical, religious, and social traditions are cited in organizing selections in various university philosophy texts. The two claims that there are universal questions to be thought about and that different philosophical answers emerge from different cultures are neither mutually exclusive nor contradictory.

In *The Faces of Reason, An essay on philosophy and culture in English-speaking Canada*, culture is discussed as being “the system of ideas which provides one’s basic orientation in belief and value. . . . As a rule one knows there are two cultures when there are two groups of people who, characteristically and repeatedly, assign different meanings to the same act or event” (Armour & Trott, pp. xxiii–xxiv). For example, the arrival of the Queen of the Commonwealth in Canada will evoke many different responses from the various cultures, communities, and provinces that make up the nation. There is never a single response from coast to coast.

Cultures differ in terms of their interpretations of an event and in terms of the significance of the meanings that identify and demarcate the event. As well, all cultures change, some more rapidly than others. How a culture copes with and adapts to both internal and external demands for change will be a defining feature of its identity. Democracies have built in mechanisms for adapting to change; other cultures have mechanisms,
such as media censorship, for resisting change. Sometimes reactions to cultural clashes are made manifest through the use of force to defend what is believed to be "right." What connects Western philosophy to its many cultures is its long history of approaching the conflicts and clashes of our many cultures and their varying beliefs and intuitions through reason. There are many routes to conflict resolution, and rational inquiry is one of them. Admittedly proponents of the other meanings associated with an event that is susceptible to radically different "readings" must be willing to recognize rational dialogue as a method of resolving serious disagreements.¹

Yet why does rational dialogue enable its proponents to offer hope for peaceful conflict resolution? Reason in the experienced world seldom has the luxury of clear statements that structure syllogisms. For the most part reason struggles to establish agreements about relevancy, context, and impartiality. There is one principle of reasoning that surpasses disagreements over the contents of syllogistic premises—the recognition of a logical relation between two opposing ideas, the dialectical relation. This principle of logic, I shall argue, is helpful in understanding multicultural communities that exhibit some stability.

Dialectical Reasoning

What creates meaning in many situations and what enables us to demarcate events is not necessarily the authority of established truths that can be repeated and re-presented, but the dialectic of opposing concepts and ideas, each of which is necessary for the other to be meaningful. Meanings do not exist in isolation. Some logically require each other. For one to understand rain, one must experience dry weather. The tension that separates each side in a debate also binds them together.² If we can recognize the dialectic relations that often frame meanings we can

¹. Should the Queen visit Quebec one hopes that editorial debates and journalistic commentaries as well as peaceful demonstrations (either of support or of disapproval) are responses rather than rock-throwing.

². This principle can also apply to moral conflicts that an individual may face. Plato's example of the locksmith, who when he has acquired the knowledge of how to build a lock also knows how to break one, demonstrates that knowledge is not enough for problem solving. It is what one does with the knowledge one has that reveals one's propensity toward problem solving techniques. If we consider freedom of belief, one person may promote true personal freedom will be achieved by accepting God, another may insist that freedom must be protected by the securing to the choice to accept God. Yet each requires the other to give weight to the significance of their campaigns. If everyone believed the same ideas the need for social control (and personal power) would be weakened. And those who want power would look for new ways to fulfill that need by creating new opportunities for tensions through conflicts.
seek a resolution of the dialectic tensions, that is, a synthesis, or new meaning that may generate agreement. The two sides of a conflict need not be left in disagreement, or in a competition to establish the “right” answer. Rather, an effort to re-frame the conflict, so as to identify what both sides share as common ground, can be encouraged. Dialectical reasoning can be understood as the search for a synthesis of new meaning when a clash of perceptions and claims seems irreconcilable. This problem solving technique can permeate a developing culture.

Early Philosophical Culture in Canada

Dialectical reasoning was a mainstay of early philosophical developments in Canada. Philosophy, as a major academic discipline, arrived in English Canada around the middle of the 19th century. Although it had been taught at the Jesuit Colleges in French-speaking Canada for nearly a century before, its existence as an independent discipline began with the publication of James Beaven's *Elements of Natural Theology* (1850). Most of the early Canadian philosophers were educated at the height of neo-Hegelianism in Britain. Their works, for the most part, can be categorized as idealist, holding to the principle that consciousness is the primary ground of our knowledge of the world. Arriving from England at the height of debates over concepts of God and the relation between science and religion, philosophers such as John Clark Murray at McGill University and John Watson at Queen’s University began to realize that the ready-made answers provided by their training in theology and philosophy in Britain made no sense in their new land (Rabb, 1988). What was apparent about the early years in Canada was that one could only survive in a community, and even though one’s neighbors might be condemned to hell for their religious beliefs, they were part of a network of people that had to help each other stay alive. Hopes for a favored position in the eyes of God through one’s piety seemed futile. For most Canadian settlers (the lone trapper aside), rugged individualism was akin to stupidity.

The idealist philosophers promoted dialectical reasoning as the mainstay of problem-solving and the ground of the emerging multicultural communities.

---

3. This is not always easy. In a conference paper, “Dialectical Reasoning and Conflict Resolution” (2000), Lucan Gregory gives an example, a conflict between native peoples’ claims and Ontario hydro plans over the Mattagami hydro project in northern Ontario. Gregory explores the bitter standoff as one of confused understandings over the meanings of the word land. For Ontario hydro, land meant a commodity with commercial value, a resource for profit. To the natives, land had intrinsic value. It was the source of many meanings in their culture, from sacred grounds, to valued lifestyles and pursuits for their survival. Money simply could not replace those meanings. Gregory suggests that some synthesis of these opposing interpretations of the concept of land could have been sought had the negotiators recognized the metaphysical nature of dispute.
If people could learn to see others to whom they were opposed (perhaps on grounds of religion, culture, race, or class) as essential to their own survival in a community then those others become essential to their own identities. Without the identities of others from whom we differentiate ourselves, our own identity means nothing. Tempting as it may be to think that cultures will automatically evolve in uniform clusters, the luxury of exclusivity in early Canada was mitigated by the difficult weather, the long distances between settlers and communities, and the need to share expertise. Accepting help when in need left no time for petty judgements about religion and character. (Those could be reserved for the town picnic in the summer.) Of course offering help was incontestably reasonable, as one quickly realized that nature is without prejudice in its ruthless assaults.

The early Canadian philosophers promoted the idealist premise that the logic of the rational order revealed by consciousness is the same for everyone. The Canadian philosophers differed from their predecessors such as Bradley and Hegel in that the Canadian scholars, while acknowledging God, did not rely (ontologically or logically) on a God, or an Absolute or any transcendent conceptual being to give legitimacy to existence. God or the Absolute was not the mainstay of existence. For the philosophers, community survival did not depend on prayer; it depended on the dialectical tensions in willful tolerance. Armour and Trott (1981, p. 4) describe the early Canadian philosophers’ use of reason as a “device to explore alternatives, to suggest ways of combining apparently contradictory ideas, to discover new ways of passing from one idea to another. Only rarely is it used as an intellectual substitute for force—a device to defeat one’s opponent, to show his ideas to be without foundation . . . There is in Canada . . . a philosophical federalism at work, an inclination to find out why one’s neighbour thinks differently rather than show him up as an idiot.” Admittedly not every problem had a peaceful solution, but those settlers who were educated through the philosophical culture of the times and who would go out into the communities, to teach, preach, and eventually govern, received the strong message that if there was a need to resolve a conflict the first line of attack should be patient debate. The oppositions the early Canadians had to struggle with, and to seek a synthesis for, have much in common with those of the Caribbean nations.

2. Canada, The Caribbean: Common Ground and Shared Contradictions

"Synthesis: the blending of cultural elements into new, original forms" (Sunshine, 1985, p. 22).

Canada and the Caribbean collective may seem to have little in common. Latitudes differentiate them dramatically, though they both have mountains, desert areas, barren rocky outcrops, plains, deep valleys, waterfalls, salt marshes, coastal wetlands (Ferguson, 1999). Canada is a country. The
Caribbean is an area, or a region, one that is instantly recognized in our vernacular but lacking in political or social cohesion. Yet we find it seemingly self-evident to refer to the Caribbean as if it were not just a geographic area, but a place that can be discussed without particularizing its member islands and countries. Many oppositions structure these discussions.

There have been those vehemently denying any commonalities that provide unifying conceptual grounds of the Caribbean “place” (Mintz, 1985, p. 10), those insisting that the “overwhelming cultural characteristic of the Caribbean, taken as the sum of its parts, is diversity.” (Sunshine, 1985, p. 19) and those who spell out a position of Caribbean acculturation, or anti-culturation and the resultant breeding grounds of the transcendent leader, coined “doctor politics” (Best, 1985). One principle used to cross island boundaries is “creolization,” but even here the use of this term has generated opposing positions on its correct reference. The “creolization” of the islands has meant the emergence of new languages from combinations of old ones; the convergence of many cultures resulting in new ones; the distinguishing of the descendants of former slaves from those inhabitants whose lineage is mainly European.4

George Beckford, in writing about the foundations of plantation society in the Caribbean, characterizes it as full of internal cultural and racial conflict but united by a single commodity economy in the extended plantation community (1983). Researchers of the Caribbean have also targeted the plantation economy with its single commodity, sugar, as a lens through which to explain the evolution of the current cultural climate, only to be disputed by those who suggest that the plantation culture offers insufficient grounds to give meaning to the absurd complexities of the Caribbean region.

Identity and cultural theorists in Canada have proposed similar principles as the grounds of cultural unity. The diversity of cultural backgrounds in Canada has been part of its roots since the first arrival of settlers in the late 1500s. The Americanization (not unlike creolization) of media and curriculum has also affected the English language with changed spellings and altered grammatical rules and produced a constant barrage of American products.5 We are, some say, just shadow Americans. Similar analyses have been offered regarding Canada. The very early internal conflicts were over who controlled the fur trade and who was exploited by its production. The French made up the majority of trappers and traders. But the


5. The people of Quebec have long had their own version of spoken French, modified from Parisian origins and now liberally spiced with American slogans from TV and movies.
Canada, The Caribbean and Multiculturalism

Scots (and to a lesser extent the English), acting like distant plantation owners, reaped the spoils of the labor through the mighty Hudson Bay Company. Arguably such economic imbalances were the source of serious conflict between the British and the French, at both the level of labor and management, and the conflict continued to find expression with increasing vigor. The early single commodity economy (fur) dominated the relations between owners and producers, with the distant owner class being in Britain, and the dependent laboring classes being in Canada. There are more parallels between Canada and the Caribbean. Both Canada and the Caribbean have concerns over their respective indigenous populations couched in the question: “Who was here first?” (Palacio, 1999). And although there was no entrenched system of slavery in Canada the master-slave paradigm is not unknown, having been used by Quebec separatists in their sovereignty struggle. Finally, one cannot fail to mention our mutual proximity to a superpower. Both Canada and the Caribbean region share multicultural histories as places peopled with persons, some displaced to their new home through force, others arriving voluntarily seeking a better life.

There is one common factor that the researchers in both countries agree about, and that is the characterization of their respective places of research as fraught with contradictions. In Canada, the synthesizing of these contradictions into a unified whole in consciousness, if not a clearly defined political identity, has been fostered by an early intellectual climate of dialectical debate, one promoted by the early philosophical academy. Shortly after their arrival in the 19th century, the philosophers’ approaches to problem-solving began to define a philosophical culture for the next hundred years. Their use of reason to understand and accommodate the differences burgeoning in the growing population offered a way for their students to integrate their philosophical exposure with the activities they might pursue, often as teachers, country parsons, government officials, and lawmakers.

Canada, the Caribbean and dialectical tensions

Lloyd Best writes about the Caribbean in terms of multiple contradictions: 1) residential vs. plantation roots, 2) managerial staff vs. plantation inmates (none having settlement interests), 3) distant landlords with no investment in progressive labor training, who, therefore, exploited the labor more to stay economically competitive, which, of course, created worsening working conditions and poorer economic performance (Best, 1985, pp. 135–140). Best cites Edward Kamau Brathwaite’s book Contradictory Omens (1974) as describing a culturally heterogenous society that defies the use of singular principles such as class confrontation or ethnic conflict as determinants of cultural identity. Best goes on to illustrate that oversimplification tends to favor the status quo implicit in the creation of categories
which contain a preference of acculturation toward the European identities, categories such as Afro Saxon (Best, 1985, pp. 145–146). Yet there is no indication that any re-conceptualization of the Caribbean, other than being a place seething with internal conflicts, misunderstood social forces, misplaced sociological analyses, and an artificial multicultural face, is being offered. The Caribbean of the academy remains a place of indeterminate identity though everyone knows exactly where and what is being discussed. We may not have fared better in articulating the essence of Canadian identity, but we do have a historical philosophical culture, and any culture’s philosophy is part of its culture. So we can ask about the contradictions faced by the early philosophers.

Certainly they faced the same philosophical problems that challenged the academy everywhere—religion versus science, social need versus economic orders, the rising dominance of individualism over community, the role of history in a nation state’s identity. They also struggled with Christian concepts of man’s God-given right to domination over nature, while discovering that nature in Canada had total power over man. In their experienced world, the philosophers were helping to educate the future civil service as well as the grassroots community leaders. At the same time the philosophers continued to grapple with the evolution of their particular colleges from being under the stewardship of religious organizations to their transfiguration as secular universities in the pursuit of “truth.”

In the practices of teaching and learning philosophy through these tumultuous times the dialectic of Hegel seemed to have enormous scope for interpreting and adapting to the new world. The students of Canada’s early philosophers, schooled in the Neo-Hegelians and in the thematic adaptations their professors offered in face of the realities in Canada, had a package for conflict resolution firmly in their head before they headed out to write their sermons for any small rural community (Trott, 1996). Doing so was never easy, for one frequently found twenty or so different cultures and religions represented by the shivering folk sitting side by side looking for guidance and consolation in the one building available for worship. (This is not to say that other buildings were not built. It is to say that the sermons for the parish had to speak to everyone who was there that morning, which might include some unknown travellers stranded over night because the roads were impassable as well as irritable Catholics and Protestants sitting at least temporarily together.) Acuity at using dialectical reasoning to resolve conceptual conflicts identifies Canadian philosophical culture of the first hundred years.

One can only observe that the contradictions that form the tensions which bind and identify a multicultural society such as the Caribbean collective need a will to resolve them in a new Caribbean identity. This idea of identity (throughout the Caribbean) animates the critics, and fuels their
It is a concept much discussed but always in terms of how terribly wrong the interpretations offered thus far really are. The dialectic of oppositions as a principle of cultural interpretation, however, has been helpful in some analyses of Caribbean identity. The use of a dialectical relation to characterize a culture within a collective has been used by Joseph Palacio. The ongoing debate about the existence of Caribbean culture, he observes, has two sets of participants: those who say it is pointless to suggest there is such a culture as everybody is different, and those who “force the argument to justify their demands for equity in the political economy.” Palacio suggests the issue of self (cultural) identity is best understood as dynamic, “an ongoing dialectical process with the rest of society” (Palacio, 1999, 27–28). Lloyd Best refers to “a state of betweenity,” (a charming re-characterization of the Hegelian becoming) in reference to the new Caribbean environment (1985, p. 143). But Hegelian logic isolated from goals and purposes can do little to conceptually unite or establish a Caribbean identity or any other place. In Canada, some other vision allowed the search for synthesis to become a principle aligned with policy.

Discovering a special focus that gives rise to a national identity is not easy. In Canada that search is complicated by the fact that people cling to regional identities and still bicker among themselves about what their regional identity might be. One can point to events and symbols—the railway, the flag, hockey—but even hockey doesn’t animate the collective consciousness uniformly. A sense of unity waxes and wanes; flag waving is periodic. Unity in a nation state can come with a common cause to pursue and agreement about how to go about doing so. Canadians will never agree about common causes. But a general appreciation of our methods of problem solving does have a place in the nation’s consciousness. This appreciation of our preference for committees, discussion, and a slow search for peaceful solutions when seeming impasses arise is, perhaps, a subtle legacy of the early philosophers and their works.

3. Multiculturalism as Dialectical

If one claims that a country or community is multicultural one can ask if the word “is” grounds a descriptive claim or one of logical identity. If it is a descriptive claim it means that the country has many cultures and collectively they are the content of the whole. If we are making a logical or metaphysical claim about identity, then the whole exists through some

6 Gallaugher’s paper details the misinterpretations that the media fosters in terms of “Caribbean identity” when reporting on the Caribbean festival held each year in Toronto but gives no insight as to what the real identifying concepts should be.
other structure—a political order, a teleology, a constitution, even a religious system. Multiculturalism could describe a set of parts or a functioning whole. If we describe Canada or the Caribbean as a set of parts, each set requires some other ordering principle to give it its own identity. Some frame of reference is required to recognize the necessity of the concept of a whole in relation to its parts. Canada is not just a set of cultures tossed together similar to a box of Lego. In such a situation the phrase Canadian culture would have no meaning. Nor would any reason exist for an identifiable culture to remain part of the set. But if multiculturalism has become a way of life, a working out of differences, because the survival of the whole requires the tension of interactive differences found in multiple communities, not uniformity or exclusivity, then opportunities for new social orders, for new syntheses, are abundant. Creative problem solving can generate new understandings and new knowledge. New knowledge seldom springs from customs, traditions, rituals, or irrational beliefs. The dialectic of identity-in-difference becomes both a method of survival and a value to be preserved. Such a recognized value surpasses descriptions of parts and defines a new whole.

Early Canadian philosophical culture can be identified by its promotion of the need to identify dialectical views and seek syntheses in solving problems. This process provides the rational tools for multicultural survival. In briefly assessing the Caribbean experience one discovers that providing explanations through oppositions has been useful as well. Yet the concept of being Caribbean or of there being a Caribbean identity is largely an invention of the research academy. If there is such an identity for members of the Caribbean place it continues to be expressed through social and historical categories. The real tensions that unite members of the Caribbean community today may be better found in their world of music, literature, and other arts born of multicultural Caribbean roots. For the arts can reveal and unite the world of multicultural contradictions. Therein may be found the values that drive the search for new orders, ones that will encourage the articulation of self-worth in a special place.

4. Appendix: John Watson

The use of dialectical reasoning in Canadian philosophy can be given life with an example. For this we turn to John Watson. John Watson taught at Queen's University (Kingston, Ontario) from 1872–1922. He was a Gifford lecturer, one of the highest honors bestowed in philosophy in the English-speaking world. His books on Kant were on curricula of universities in Canada and the USA for the next fifty years. His debates with Josiah Royce were reported in the New York Times. God, evolution, and the independence of human beings as reasoning agents were critical top-
ics at the time. The Americans' propensity for right answers on the evolution issues eventually found expression in the famous Scopes Monkey Trials. The Canadian philosophical response to Darwin was to adapt concepts of God to the new discoveries of science. Watson's use of dialectical reasoning can be found in all his writings.

In his book, *The State in Peace and War*, Watson (1919) promotes the theme that "the individual and his society are related to one another in a way which makes for mutual interdependence" (Armour & Trott, 1981, p. 233). He does not see that society can be supreme over the individual (even in the guise of the state) or that the individual can be supreme over society. Society is understood as the organic functioning of different individuals. Each individual exists because the society makes his life possible. But society must be ordered so that one can be individuated, one's goals and agenda exhibited as one's own.

Watson writes, "A system of Rights is necessary. . . . The justification of this claim is not any fictitious 'right of nature,' but the just claim that without freedom to live his own life under recognized external conditions, he is not capable of contributing to the common good . . . rights . . . recognized by society are not made right by legislation, but are recognized because they are essential to the development of the common good" (Watson, 1919, p. 222). Watson goes on to say that possessing rights and recognizing rights are the same thing. Rights are required for the highest good of all.

We can now see Watson's own development of the dialectical method. Individual and society are dialectical partners, each essential to the existence of the other. The state, the concept of social order, emerges as reason develops models that maximize individual differentiations. These differentiations must be given freedom to flourish—rights of freedom which contribute to everyone's opportunity to flourish. This process is facilitated by recognizing rights not just as liberation devices but as the dialectical opposite of freedom—rational restraint. Watson, in his job of teaching every undergraduate passing through Queen's University, hammered that message home. The students who fanned out across the country to staff the schools and the churches, and those who headed for the civil service in Ottawa, left his classes with a mission of establishing and supporting

---

institutions that would make possible freedom to seek solutions, not impose them, and the belief that common ground for conflicting responses to problems, sooner or later, would emerge.\(^8\)

Watson predicted that the church would become invisible and would synthesize into an agency for social service and not remain a separate haven for transcendent thought. A similar recognition of the role of the church is cited by Catherine Sunshine in *Caribbean: Survival, Struggle and Sovereignty* (1985). Sunshine quotes Dr. Aldopho Ham (Caribbean Conference of Churches, 1983): "Only when the Church is a servant—when the Church identifies fully with the needs and spirit of the people, is when she can be the church" (Sunshine, 1985, p. 98). For Watson, fixed right answers, fixed beliefs, all ignored the fact of social evolution. Watson's thoughts on rational religion left in their wake the shaken and the challenged.\(^9\) When Watson declared traditional church doctrines to be "impedimenta" to understanding the union of God, man, and reason, and stated the church was an "organization to make men better" and not the harbinger of true beliefs, his students who staffed the schools and churches carried reasoning, not rhetoric, across the country (McKillop, 1987, p. 103).

8. Canadians were not expected to like each other. Liking someone is a matter of personal taste, not really relevant to problem solving. In 1958, when my grandmother provided room and meals one summer for four black students from the University of Chicago who were selling Bibles in rural Ontario to help pay their fees, the locals raised their eyebrows. "Really, Alice," they said. She stared them down and replied, "They need a place to stay, and I have two empty bedrooms." Reason ruled, though not everyone had a taste for it. By the end of the summer the community had sung with the students at church, taught them how to drive a tractor, served them sandwiches at haying time, and bought more Bibles than anyone could ever need. The students kept in touch with our family and went on to become surgeons, lawyers, and teachers.

9. A. B. McKillop, *Contours of Canadian Thought* (University of Toronto Press, 1987, p. 103) documents a series of letters between Watson and a Mr. J. H. Grant, who finally concluded that he had no choice but to abandon Presbyterianism and join the Unitarians.

References


Elizabeth Trott
Department of Philosophy
Ryerson University,
Toronto, ON, Canada
etrott@ryerson.ca